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FOREWORD 
 
The GTZ is supporting developing countries in implementing the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change through its Climate Protection Programme (CaPP) and other bilateral projects, all financed by the 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The CaPP focuses on 
country- and regionally oriented activities concerned with the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and 
adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change. However, methodological issues and climate policy 
are also addressed in various individual CaPP-supported projects. CaPP was thus able to respond 
favourably to a request from the Energy Research Centre (South Africa) and the Wuppertal Institute for 
Climate, Environment and Energy (Germany) for support for a South-North dialogue project. The subject 
was a framework for future climate negotiations. This dialogue involved researchers from all over the 
world, with the majority coming from developing countries.  
 
It was the understanding of the researchers from the outset that equity needs to be fully reflected in a 
future climate change regime. Accordingly, the project was entitled “South-North Dialogue on Equity in the 
Greenhouse”. Furthermore, four broad themes were identified to reflect the equity dimension of an 
effective climate change regime: 
a) mitigation and burden-sharing 
b) impacts on climate change and financial transfers 
c) capacity to engage politically and  
d) intranational equity. 
 
The results of the South-North dialogue are compiled in this report. A forward-looking and challenging 
proposal on how to distribute commitments and responsibilities among a new set of country groups based 
on the equity concept is presented. We trust that the forthcoming discussion on the future climate change 
regime will benefit from these results.  
 
I would like to emphasise here that the GTZ and the BMZ played only a facilitating role in this project and 
in no way influenced the substantial outcome of the South-North dialogue. This is in line with the 
supporting role of German Technical Assistance in cooperation with developing countries. 
 
The South-North dialogue team of 15 researchers from renowned organisations were guided by 
Dr. Herrmann E. Ott and Bernd Brouns of the Wuppertal Institute and Harald Winkler of the Energy 
Research Centre. I would like to commend the whole team for their enthusiasm and hard work throughout 
the project and the innovative ideas that made this remarkable outcome possible. 
 
To enable the results to be fed into the further discussion on the future climate change regime, the BMZ 
and GTZ are considering supporting regional workshops in Asia, Africa and Latin America in which the 
South-North dialogue team has a key role to play. 
 
 
Holger Liptow 
Director 
Climate Protection Programme 
GTZ GmbH 
 
 
 
 Steve Bernow (Tellus Institute) who was part of the ‘South-North Dialogue’ passed away on Saturday, 
July 5 while on vacation in Croatia. We mourn his loss and the gap that he has left in our midst. At our 
workshop on 8/9 June in Wuppertal we had a last chance to take advantage of his knowledge, dedication, 
humour and social intelligence. He will be missed. But we also celebrate his life and his contribution to the 
debate around equity. May Steve’s legacy live on, in one small way, in the work that we continue.
South-North Dialogue team
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International climate policy is at a crossroads. On the 
one hand negotiations have reached a deadlock in the 
past two years as all countries wait for Russia to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand there is a lively 
debate beyond official negotiations on options for 
the mid- and long-term development of the climate 
regime, and a growing recognition that such a devel-
opment is of utmost importance. In the near future, 
progressive forces in the climate arena should strongly 
focus on bringing the Kyoto Protocol into force; in the 
years to come, the crucial issue will be how to design 
the climate regime so that it effectively combats fur-
ther climate change without jeopardizing the basic 
development needs of developing countries. Regard-
less of when or whether the Kyoto Protocol enters into 
force, the challenge of future climate negotiations will 
be to embed the next steps in a long-term framework 
that aims at an adequate and equitable global climate 
agreement that takes into account the right to sustain-
able development of all countries. 
A package capable of constituting such an agreement 
will thus need to meet the key challenges of equity 
and adequacy. Our proposal examines equitable 
approaches to mitigation – including both deep cuts in 
the North, and differentiated mitigation commitments 
for developing countries. Our proposal further exam-
ines adaptation, as no agreement will be equitable or 
adequate if it fails to incorporate appropriate burden 
sharing mechanisms to address the needs of those most 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Such an 
agreement requires leadership by individual countries 
and groups of countries. It can also be strengthened 
by support from non-state actors. The alliance for an 
adequate and equitable global climate agreement will 
have to include the EU, key developing countries and 
civil society actors. With such an alliance leading, it 
may be possible to bring other non-Annex I parties 
into the climate regime – a step that has long been 
recognised as essential.
An adequate and equitable global 
climate agreement
What is required for a climate regime to be adequate is 
clearly defined in the ultimate objective of the Climate 
Convention. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions must 
decline sufficiently to allow atmospheric concentra-
tions to stabilize at a level ‘that would prevent danger-
ous anthropogenic interference with the climate sys-
tem’ (Art. 2 UNFCCC), within a timeframe that will 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally, not threaten food 
production, and enable sustainable economic develop-
ment. However, although ambitious and encompass-
ing, this objective falls far short of being an operational 
definition, as it is not easily translated into constraints 
on society’s GHG emitting activities. 
Many scientific and political institutions have pro-
posed that the term ‘dangerous’ be defined for pur-
poses of Article 2 as a temperature increase above 2ºC 
compared to pre-industrial levels, including the Euro-
pean Union, the German Advisory Council on Global 
Change, and the Climate Action Network (for refer-
ences please refer to the main text after the proposal 
and the bibliography). In view of the guidance from 
the Climate Convention, aiming at development below 
2°C appears to be reasonable, taking into account the 
following:
• A temperature rise of 2°C already commits the 
Earth to significant climate change. Adaptation 
measures therefore would have to be undertaken, 
starting in the near-term, which raises the issues of 
compensation and liability.
• Climate science cannot yet tell us with any cer-
tainty that a temperature increase exceeding 2°C 
will not produce ‘serious or irreversible damage’.
• There is considerable uncertainty in the tempera-
ture rise that would actually result, even if our best 
estimates suggest that we are on a ‘2°C trajectory’.
• It appears possible to embark on this trajectory 
without prohibitive economic losses.
Proposal: Towards an adequate and equitable 
global climate agreement
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Therefore, this dialogue assumes such a trajectory as 
a likely target for addressing climate change. How-
ever, the target to stay below a temperature increase of 
2°C globally poses an unprecedented global challenge. 
Rather profound infrastructural transitions would be 
needed to allow global emissions to peak by 2020. The 
complexity and cost of this transition increase with 
each passing year of business-as-usual development, 
as society continues to invest in capital that embodies 
a commitment to years or even decades of contin-
ued GHG emissions: vehicles with 10 year lifetimes, 
industrial facilities with 30 year lifetimes, homes and 
office buildings with 100 year lifetimes, and urban/
peri-urban development patterns with almost indefi-
nite lifetimes. Earlier actions pay off in the long run, 
including change of development paths and consumer 
behaviour. Facilitating the development of the South 
along a low-GHG path starting in the very near future 
is an intrinsic part of meeting the climate challenge. 
This points to the central role of equity in addressing 
the climate challenge.
Equity arises in the climate regime with respect to 
four broad themes. As the need for serious mitigation 
effort intensifies and as the impacts of climate change 
become ever more visible, addressing these equity 
dimensions will grow increasingly complex but also 
increasingly important for the implementation of an 
effective climate regime. 
• Mitigation and burden-sharing: Attaining a 2°C 
trajectory will require near global participation. 
Not only must emissions in the wealthier North 
be curtailed radically, but emissions in the poorer 
South as well must diverge considerably from a 
conventional, fossil-intensive and highly GHG-
emitting development trajectory. The required 
global resolve will only materialize, however, if 
an equitable framework is offered that acknowl-
edges the disparities among nations in (historic 
and continuing) emissions and levels of develop-
ment. 
• Impacts of climate change and financial transfers: 
The impacts of climate change, which communi-
ties are already feeling, will continue to acceler-
ate even if a 2°C trajectory were attained. These 
impacts will fall disproportionately on the South, 
while the causes are primarily Northern. This is 
reflected in the continuing and persistent efforts 
of the Southern negotiators to make adaptation 
a priority item on the negotiating agenda, espe-
cially since COP 6b in 2001, and this focus will 
only intensify as impacts are more keenly felt. 
Equitably addressing this issue will entail provid-
ing resources for adaptation and addressing claims 
for climate-related damages that warrant relief.
• Capacity to engage politically: An equitable proc-
ess (i.e. procedural equity) is a precondition for 
an equitable outcome. Yet there are currently 
vast disparities among the Parties in negotiating 
strength that preclude an equitable process. The 
lopsidedness has so far been tolerated because the 
major obligations of the climate regime to date 
have fallen on the North. Unremedied, however, 
these disparities in negotiating capacity will make 
it increasingly difficult for developing countries to 
have a sense of ownership of the evolving climate 
regime. Significant capacity building assistance 
and resources, well beyond those already provid-
ed, will be required if the countries of the South 
are to engage confidently in the subsequent stages 
of the climate regime.
• Intranational equity: Intranational equity is a 
cross-cutting theme. Overwhelmingly, equity 
as discussed in the climate context is implicitly 
viewed at the international level. However, as 
the disparities among nations are echoed within 
nations, equity issues relating to climate are no 
less profound at the intranational level. Many of 
the distinctions made between North and South 
hide the large differences (and at times, inequali-
ties) within countries.
Responses to the climate challenge
Mitigation and adaptation have been recognized as 
both being responses to the problem of anthropogenic 
climate change. However, mitigation is the key meas-
ure to address the root cause of anthropogenic climate 
change, namely GHG emissions. While some adap-
tation will be necessary to deal with climate change 
to which the world is already committed, ultimately 
mitigation is the best form of adaptation. Adaptation 
will become increasingly difficult (and more costly), 
the less mitigative action is taken – and some adverse 
impacts such as the loss of rare species or the melting 
of glaciers cannot be reclaimed by adaptation meas-
ures at all.
Mitigation
The focus of the ultimate objective of the Climate Con-
vention in Article 2, namely ‘to achieve stabilization 
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere’, 
indicates a consensus among Parties to take action 
for mitigation. The problem the world is facing is not 
whether mitigation is important, but who mitigates 
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and how much. What is required in thinking beyond 
2012 is, therefore, further and more systematic dif-
ferentiation among countries, also in the South. To be 
both fair and reflective of national circumstances, dif-
ferentiation should be based on the criteria of respon-
sibility, capability and potential to mitigate. For each 
of these criteria, we consider specific, concrete indica-
tors to quantitatively capture each country’s national 
situation.
• Responsibility has been defined in the Brazilian 
proposal directly in relation to the contribution to 
temperature increase. In this analysis, we use the 
approximation of cumulative emissions of fossil 
CO2 over the period 1990 to 2000 as an indica-
tor of responsibility. The relatively recent period 
avoids ‘punishing’ countries for historical emis-
sions, when the consequences were less widely 
known. At least since the IPCC’s First Assessment 
Report in 1990, the implications can be said to be 
well-known internationally.
• A country may have high responsibility for con-
tributing GHG emissions, but nonetheless be too 
poor to mitigate. For this reason we include indi-
cators reflecting capability. Emissions do not have 
to be linked to human development, but under 
given socio-economic and technological condi-
tions, a certain level of emissions will be neces-
sary to guarantee a decent life for poor people. We 
consider two indicators of capability, the human 
development index (HDI) and GDP per capita. 
Countries with higher levels of national income 
and a higher rank on the HDI would be expected 
to carry a higher burden of mitigation. 
• The potential to mitigate can be related to three 
factors – emissions intensity, emissions per capita 
and emissions growth rate. A high value for CO2/
GDP would suggest high potential to mitigate. The 
more efficient an economy already is (lower CO2 
emissions per unit GDP), the less potential there 
is (at a given cost) to mitigate further through effi-
ciency. However, the level of emissions per capita 
needs to be taken into account as well. High per 
capita emissions suggest unsustainable consump-
tion patterns, which should provide potential 
to mitigate without endangering a basic level of 
development, e.g. by life style changes. National 
circumstances such as resource endowments also 
influence mitigation potential. Finally, the growth 
rate of absolute emissions gives an idea of whether 
the rate of increase is still high or has already been 
curbed. 
Deep cuts in the North
Based on the criteria of responsibility, capability and 
potential, the first level of differentiation contained 
in the Convention, that between Annex I and non-
Annex I, remains valid. As a consequence, it is obvious 
that emissions reductions in Annex I countries must 
be strengthened considerably in the period after 2012. 
Emission targets set by the Kyoto Protocol were only a 
first step in inflecting the curve of growing emissions, 
and the next steps must involve much more ambi-
tious targets. Some Annex I countries have recognised 
the urgency of action and set such targets. The UK’s 
energy white paper ‘Our energy future’, for example, 
recommends a 60 per cent reduction of industrialised 
countries’ GHG emissions by 2050, the German Advi-
sory Council on Global Change recommends GHG 
emissions reductions for industrialised countries by 
at least 20 per cent by 2020.
Differentiation among non-Annex I countries
Based on the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’, emissions 
from non-Annex I countries have not been subject to 
quantitative emission commitments up to now. How-
ever, any definition of adequacy consistent with Arti-
cle 2 of the Convention will require increased mitiga-
tion efforts from almost all countries. Emissions from 
at least some non-Annex I countries will need to start 
to decrease in the fairly near future to complement the 
dramatic reductions being undertaken in the North. 
This is particularly true for newly industrialised and 
rapidly industrialising developing countries. 
In order to take forward the negotiation process, there 
is a need for further differentiation among develop-
ing countries. Differentiating among these countries 
analytically does not imply that the G77 should not 
negotiate together, but is intended to outline differ-
ent implications for taking action on climate change. 
To be both fair and reflective of national circum-
stances, differentiation should be based on the criteria 
of responsibility, capability and potential to mitigate 
(see above). 
For each of the criteria, non-Annex I countries’ indica-
tors cover a very wide range of values, usually from very 
low to very high. Given this diversity of national cir-
cumstances, there is little reason to think that all non-
Annex I countries would act the same way in respond-
ing to climate change. While recognising that the ‘G77 
& China’ bloc remains an important vehicle for solidar-
ity, developing countries will need to identify different 
forms of climate action for different members. 
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The analysis here seeks to provide a more analyti-
cal base for groupings of (developing) countries by 
identifying some new groups, such as newly industr-
ialised countries (NICs) and rapidly industrialising 
developing countries (RIDCs) that are seen particu-
larly important in taking the next round of climate 
negotiations forward (see Table). Least-developed 
countries (LDCs) were excluded from the analysis, 
almost by definition not qualifying as industrialising. 
All other non-Annex I countries were ranked by a an 
index combining responsibility, potential and capa-
bility – equally weighting cumulative emissions per 
capita, the HDI and an indicator of potential (derived 
from CO2/GDP and GHG/capita). NICs were then 
identified as those countries with the highest aggregate 
score. Focusing on those non-Annex I countries with 
a medium index value those countries were defined as 
RIDCs having relative rapid industrial growth in the 
last decade and relatively high income. The remaining 
developing countries were grouped as ‘other develop-
ing countries’. Altogether, non-Annex I countries were 
differentiated in four groups each including countries 
with similar national circumstances (see Annex 1 for 
all groups’ compositions). These groupings build the 
basis for the assigning of mitigation and financial 
transfer commitments. 
Adaptation
Climate change is already underway. Even if efforts 
to reduce emissions are strengthened, the support for 
adaptation to the impacts of climate change will have 
to gain a far more prominent role in the evolution 
of the future climate regime, as the effects of mitiga-
tion measures taken now will not be seen for years to 
come. The required efforts can build on the provisions 
included in the Climate Convention. Numerous Con-
vention principles and articles stress the importance 
of developed country leadership on adaptation. These 
principles state the need for developed country par-
ties to take the lead in combating the adverse effects of 
climate change, state the need for the full considera-
tion of the specific needs and special circumstances 
of developing country parties, and emphasize the role 
of the precautionary principle in the anticipation and 
mitigation of the adverse effects of climate change. 
The Convention also contains a number of specific 
commitments on adaptation that various categories of 
countries are to undertake, in keeping with the princi-
ple of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. 
As many developing countries (and their communities) 
lack the physical, financial, technical and technological 
capacity to cope with the adverse impacts of climate 
change, the main challenge of adaptation policy will 
be understanding and identifying of adaptation needs 
and actions given national circumstances and adap-
tive capabilities. As adaptation activities can be capital-
intensive and benefits highly localised and immediate, 
the real challenge will be the development of secure, 
adequate and predictable funding streams for prior-
ity adaptation needs, as well as equitable frameworks 
for access to this funding. Related challenges will be 
the development of strategies to increase the adap-
tive capacity and resilience of vulnerable countries to 
projected impacts, and the development of equitable 
burden sharing arrangements among developed coun-
tries for the financing of adaptation needs. Funding 
for adaptation should be linked to responsibility for 
the impacts of climate change, to operationalise the 
polluter pays principle. 
Even though the Convention requires developed 
country parties to provide funding for adaptation, to 
date the financial mechanism for the Convention (the 
Global Environment Facility/GEF) has spent only a 
small fraction (less than 8 per cent) of its funding on 
adaptation over the last ten years of its existence. In 
addition to the GEF three distinct funding sources 
have been created to address adaptation activities: 
the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special 
Climate Change Fund, both created under the Con-
vention, and the Adaptation Fund, created under the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, current mechanisms for 
funding adaptation are neither sufficient nor linked 
to responsibility.
Apart from funds, other (financial) mechanisms need 
to be established addressing adaptation. Tiered national 
and regional insurance schemes that utilize traditional 
insurance mechanisms, collective loss-sharing ele-
ments, and global reinsurance mechanisms, may also 
be useful in addressing the impacts of climate change. 
These and other innovative risk transfer mechanisms 
can assist developing countries in managing risk from 
extreme weather events, aiding recovery efforts and 
contributing to sustainable development. At the same 
time, these mechanisms assist in sharing the burden 
of responsibility for damages resulting from climate 
change among the broader global community.
Last but not least there is an enormous need for capac-
ity building in developing countries if an equitable 
framework on adaptation is to be developed. Capac-
ity building is needed at many different levels, and in 
many different areas, e.g. negotiating capacity, scien-
tific and technological knowledge, public awareness. 
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Recommendations
On the following pages, the South-North Dialogue 
group proposes a policy package that offers guidance 
on the content of a future climate agreement (com-
mitments for mitigation and adaptation activities as 
well as required financial transfers) and the process of 
achieving it.
Commitments on mitigation
In the long term, any definition of adequacy consistent 
with UNFCCC Article 2 will require increased mitiga-
tion efforts from almost all countries. Therefore, an 
expansion of emission limitation commitments will 
form a central element of any future architecture of 
the climate regime. This expansion has two elements: 
deepening of quantitative commitments for Annex B 
countries and the adoption of commitments for those 
countries outside of the limitation regime. 
Rules for determining mitigation commitments
Based on the three criteria that were applied for the 
differentiation of countries (responsibility, capability 
and potential to mitigate), a set of decision rules was 
developed to determine type(s) of commitments for 
each of the six groups of countries identified: 
• The potential to mitigate determines the amount 
of reductions to be carried out domestically. A 
country with a high potential would be obliged to 
exploit this potential, i.e. to accept commitments 
to reduce domestic emissions. However, this com-
mitment is in the context of a climate regime 
where financial and technological resources for 
mitigation are assured, so the level of mitigation 
efforts as determined by this rule does not imply 
that countries would necessarily have to pay for 
their mitigation efforts themselves.
• The amount a country is obliged to pay toward 
mitigation is determined by responsibility to miti-
gate in combination with capability to mitigate. 
Countries having high capability and responsibility 
would be obliged to pay for all their emission reduc-
tions, and also to provide financial and technologi-
cal resources for mitigation in other countries with 
medium/low capability and responsibility. 
• Higher levels of responsibility suggest not only a 
higher level of resources devoted to mitigation, 
but also a binding legal form of their mitiga-
tion commitment. Commitments for those with 
medium responsibility would be binding only if 
all ‘high responsibility’ countries have taken on 
mitigation and funding commitments, while low 
responsibility suggests mitigation action of a vol-
untary nature. 
Implications for specific groups of countries
Applying these decision rules to the six country 
groups results in (strict) reduction commitments for 
Annex I countries, but also implies quantifiable miti-
gation obligations for some non-Annex I countries 
assisted by financial transfers from the North. It is 
worth emphasising that certainly Annex I countries 
still must take the lead in combating climate change. 
However, at least some non-Annex I countries would 
have to contribute more substantially to global mitiga-
tion efforts than they already did in the past. A closer 
look at the resulting commitment reveals the following 
(see Table): 
• Both Annex I groups – Annex II and others - retain 
Kyoto-style quantitative commitments, i.e. quan-
tified (absolute) emissions reduction obligations 
with targets for Annex II countries being more 
demanding than Kyoto levels. The latter would 
also be committed to financial and technologi-
cal transfers to those non-Annex I countries with 
low-to-medium capability to mitigate. 
• Countries belonging to the group of NICs and 
RIDCs would have to take on quantitative miti-
gation commitments as well – although sub-
ject to the conditionality that all major Annex I 
countries (including the USA) take on quantified 
emission reduction commitments and fulfil their 
commitments to provide financial and techno-
logical resources. NIC countries, due to their high 
responsibility and potential to mitigate, would 
have absolute limitation or reduction commit-
ments, but also will have access to financial and 
technological resources (from Annex II countries) 
to help them fulfil the commitments. RIDC coun-
tries would also take on absolute limitation targets, 
and would have access to an even greater share of 
resources, consistent with their lower capacities. 
Regardless of whether the terms of conditionality 
for quantified commitments are fulfilled, NICs as 
well as RIDCs would engage in qualitative mitiga-
tion commitments.
• Qualitative mitigation commitments (policies and 
measures) will also be obligatory for the group 
of ‘other developing countries’, but quantifiable 
mitigation commitments for these countries and 
the LDC group would be not justifiable – and not 
in line with the decision rules (until their status 
changes).
• There must be agreed triggers (like ‘binding obli-
gations for all major industrialised countries’) 
6 SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE ON EQUITY IN THE GREENHOUSE
 
that would lead to the start of developing country 
quantitative emission targets. While these triggers 
can be quantitatively defined, even more impor-
tant is getting political agreement on what they 
should be. They further differ from graduation 
triggers in that they may include conditions for 
both developing and industrialised countries.
The approach chosen for differentiation among coun-
tries in order to assign different kinds of commitments 
is not static. As national circumstances in countries 
evolve over time, the composition of the groups will 
change. If a country exceeds (or falls below) a certain 
threshold in all of the three criteria (potential, respon-
sibility, capability to mitigate), it will move from one 
group to another group and, as a consequence, will 
have to take on other types of commitments. Coun-
tries graduate when their indicators become more 
representative of the next higher group. Therefore, 
after each commitment period, the composition of 
the groups may need to be modified.
Commitments on adaptation
The issue of adaptation to climate change has risen 
rapidly up the policy agenda, both internationally and 
nationally. It is clear that much remains to be done to 
gain a better understanding of the multitude and com-
plexity of issues involved, through research and analy-
sis. It is also clear that far more ambitious efforts must 
be taken to chart a way forward in addressing these 
issues both inside and outside the international nego-
tiating process. One observation cannot be refuted: 
little further progress in the international negotiations 
can be expected without taking into account the con-
cerns of most of the developing countries, which relate 
in large part to funding and mechanisms for address-
ing adaptation to the impacts of climate change. 
• Equity: Many of the most severe adverse impacts 
of climate change will fall on the poorest countries 
and communities. The ‘polluter pays’ principle 
enshrined in the UNFCCC makes it incumbent 
on Annex I countries to build the adaptive capac-
ity of the poorer and most vulnerable countries. 
The notions of equity and justice must be recog-
nised and applied in future negotiations, with the 
implications of these key principles reflected in 
both the decision-making process on adaptation, 
and in the substance of the decisions taken, with 
respect to impacts, vulnerabilities and funding for 
adaptation measures.
• Capacity building: There is an enormous need for 
capacity building in developing countries at dif-
ferent levels and in many different areas if an equi-
table framework on adaptation is to be developed. 
Negotiating capacity must be strengthened aim-
ing at (i) building negotiating skills; (ii) building 
in-country ability to develop negotiating positions 
based on country priorities; (iii) creating oppor-
tunities for interaction between developing coun-
try negotiators between international negotiating 
sessions. Besides, stakeholders involved in sectors 
that have been identified as vulnerable to climate 
change require sector-specific capacity build-
ing on viable adaptation strategies and options. 
Similarily, capacity building is needed to sensitise 
policy-makers to the impacts their decision mak-
ing may have on adaptive capacity. Last but not 
least, greater efforts are needed to increase public 
awareness of both the potential impacts of climate 
change and possible adaptation options and strat-
egies, to enable decision making at the individual 
and community levels.
• Responsibility for funding: Funding for adaptation 
must be linked to responsibility for the impacts 
of climate change. The UNFCCC’s ‘polluter pays’ 
principle needs to be operationalised for appropri-
ate burden sharing, and existing liability and com-
pensation schemes, e.g. the oil spill and nuclear 
regimes, may provide useful guidance. Adequate 
and predictable revenue streams are essential 
for adaptation funding, and new and additional 
sources of funding must be identified.
• Funding mechanisms: The current rules for fund-
ing adaptation through the GEF, which include 
incremental costs and global benefits criteria for 
project approval, must be modified to enable adap-
tation projects to be undertaken that result largely 
or exclusively in local benefits. The allocation of 
separate and discrete funds by the GEF for adapta-
tion to the impacts of climate change may facilitate 
the modification of the GEF’s funding strategy.
 The capacity of countries to access GEF fund-
ing for adaptation, to conceive and undertake 
GEF projects, and to mainstream adaptation into 
national development all need to be enhanced, and 
supported through new and additional funding. 
Activities for external funding need to be prac-
tised on a rational basis (e.g. through prioritising 
actions with adaptation as well as mitigation ben-
efits, and prioritising the needs of the most vul-
nerable communities). Immediate focus should be 
given to finalising the negotiations on the SCCF, 
reemphasizing that ‘adaptation to the impacts of 
climate change’ is of ‘top priority’.
• Insurance: Innovative insurance schemes should 
be explored and piloted for the management of 
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climate risks at the local, national, regional and 
international levels. A variety of alternative insur-
ance schemes and risk transfer mechanisms hold 
great potential for attracting interest from the 
private capital markets, for instruments that can 
be used to address risks related to climate change 
impacts. Public-private partnerships, between 
the governments of nations vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change and the insurance 
industry, present useful opportunities to leverage 
both governmental and private sector expertise to 
address climate-related risks. The establishment 
of an international fund to backstop reinsurance 
schemes, to support private-public partnerships, 
or to backstop national disaster funds while they 
are in their infancy, may assist in rendering certain 
climate risks insurable. Such a fund might also 
provide necessary support to public-private insur-
ance schemes that link insurance availability with 
incentives to reduce vulnerability and enhance 
resilience. These sorts of schemes have already 
proven quite successful in combining risk trans-
fer with risk reduction strategies in disaster-prone 
communities (e.g. Turkish catastrophe insurance 
fund). 
Political leadership
While the content of a future climate agreement raises 
a number of challenges relating to mitigation, adapta-
tion and funding, the process of achieving such an 
agreement is deeply political and worth detailed analy-
sis. The roles of key players such as the US, the EU, 
G77 & China, and other parties needs to be analysed 
with respect to their leadership potential. An alliance 
of parties – from both South and North – that might 
champion an adequate and equitable global climate 
agreement is required. 
Experience in international environmental governance 
indicates that in order to achieve progress in regula-
tion, leadership by a strong country or group of coun-
tries is required. The European Union has at different 
stages of the negotiation process employed leadership 
qualities, but it lacks a coherent strategy that is persist-
ent over a longer period of time. To lead the process of 
negotiating towards an adequate and equitable global 
climate agreement, an alliance between the EU, key 
developing countries and civil society will be essential. 
Other industrialised countries like Japan, Canada and 
those from the Environmental Integrity Group will 
also have to play an important role. This is required 
in particular because the US, in 2002, has changed its 
position from a laisser-faire approach to one of oppo-
sition to the Kyoto Protocol. The climate community 
therefore faces the task of stabilising and evolving the 
regime – at least for the time being – against the oppo-
sition of the world’s major player.
Leadership strategies
The USA will not ratify the Kyoto Protocol in the fore-
seeable future. Even a change in the presidency would 
not affect the composition of the Senate, which must 
accept international treaties with a two-thirds major-
ity. However, re-engagement by the US is the key for 
successful climate policy aiming at the ambitious goal 
of preventing dangerous interference with the climate 
system. Since political, diplomatic, or economic pres-
sure from outside might have only minor impact on 
US policy – internal political processes alone will lead 
to change. These internal political processes can and 
should be supported from outside, however. As a first 
pillar of a successful strategy, alternative avenues of 
co-operating and engaging with the US outside of the 
Kyoto regime should be explored. One avenue, which 
is pursued already, is the engagement of the US in tech-
nological enterprises. There are, furthermore, many 
ways of co-operation with federal and sub-federal 
actors. Support (and possibly funding) of sub-federal 
entities like states, local communities, scientific and 
advocacy groups in the United States has the poten-
tial to change the political climate and thus increase 
pressure at the domestic level. Implementing climate 
policies at the sub-federal level will further increase 
the chances of re-integrating the US in the climate 
regime, since otherwise the implementation gap will 
increase even further. 
A second pillar of a climate strategy in the years to 
come consists of a firm commitment by all Kyoto Par-
ties towards the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakesh 
Accords. This means, first of all, for all countries to 
prepare implementation of their commitments as if 
the Kyoto Protocol was in force already. Furthermore, 
the protocol should form the basis of any negotiations 
for the time after 2012 and preserving the integrity of 
the Kyoto Protocol should be the guiding principle 
even in the case that Russia refuses to ratify. 
Third, the EU will have to play an equally strong role 
as in the past if it wants progress on climate change 
– and probably more. As experiences with overcoming 
obstacles in the past have demonstrated, progress in 
the climate regime was usually dependent on a good 
understanding between the EU and developing coun-
tries. Since COP 8 in New Delhi, diplomatic relations 
between the EU and developing countries are strained 
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and need a conscious rebuilding. This requires first of 
all an open ear for the needs and fears of the South and, 
second, the willingness to provide substantial financial 
means for mitigation and adaptation activities. Finally, 
the alliance between the EU (and other industrialised 
countries like Canada, Japan) and developing coun-
tries needs to be built on the firm recognition that 
mitigation and adaptation are two sides of the same 
coin and that none of those efforts will be successful 
without the other.
Fourth, developing countries can only regain their 
leadership qualities if they rethink their role in the 
climate negotiations, thus rendering their negotiat-
ing position more effective. This concerns individual 
countries as well as the group as such. The fixation 
on the bloc of G77 & China – historically with good 
reasons – has led to stagnation, since the diverging 
and sometimes conflicting interests of such a diverse 
group of countries tends to lead to agreement on the 
lowest common denominator. It is thus of paramount 
importance to realise these differences and make seri-
ous attempts at reconciling and co-ordinating a best 
possible outcome. Equally important will be careful 
coalition building within the bloc in order to foster 
leadership. Such a coalition to support an effective 
and equitable global climate agreement should include 
China, India and Brazil, and must be supported by a 
second layer of rapidly industrialising countries. This 
coalition would be strong enough to counter obstruc-
tionist tendencies by OPEC countries. This coalition 
would likely receive support from the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS), which has a vital interest in a 
successful climate regime. LDCs share this interest, 
and would similarly provide support, particularly if 
greater opportunities are provided for adaptation/sus-
tainable development. 
Fifth, there is a range of options for civil society actors 
to adapt to new challenges posed by the complexity of 
the climate challenge, accelerating globalisation proc-
esses and the unilateral attitude of the USA. The NGO 
community might attempt to gain increased influ-
ence on domestic policy in the US. If it is true that 
policy change there will have to come from within, 
the achievement of a more favourable political climate 
in this one country is a top priority for domestic and 
international organisations alike. Southern NGOs and 
Southern civil society are crucial for the future of the 
climate regime – any support for those groups and 
individuals enhances the chances to win allies among 
developing countries. NGOs might play an even more 
active role in facilitating a rapprochement between 
the EU and the South. They might furthermore have 
an important role in the process of differentiation 
between developing countries. Such a leadership alli-
ance formed by the (enlarged) EU, key developing 
countries and civil society should be guided by the 
vision of an equitable and adequate global climate 
agreement. This will only be reached if both responses 
to climate change – mitigation and adaptation – (as 
outlined above) play a prominent role in climate nego-
tiations. 
Will the EU-25 continue to play  
a leadership role?
It is not yet discernible what kind of impact the enlarge-
ment of the EU in May 2004 to a community of 25 countries 
will have on its ability to play a strong role internationally. 
Of course, its economic and political weight will increase 
along with the increase in population and markets. How-
ever, the new member states will add additional interests 
and thus complexity. In any case it can be expected that 
the enlargement will have a profound impact on the EU in 
the years from 2005 – exactly those years where the sec-
ond commitment period (or an enactment without Russian 
ratification) must be negotiated. 
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1 Foundations 
Future negotiations on further action to combat 
climate change are to be embedded in a long-term 
framework aiming at an adequate and equitable glo-
bal climate regime. Equity requires that the obliga-
tions assigned to nations for achieving this outcome 
fairly reflects their radically different responsibilities, 
capabilities, and potentials to mitigate as well as their 
rights to sustainable development. Adequacy requires 
that greenhouse gas emissions decline sufficiently to 
‘prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system’ (Art. 2 UNFCCC).
1.1 Article 2, adequacy and impacts
Article 2 of the Climate Convention states: 
The ultimate objective of this Convention and 
any related legal instruments that the Confer-
ence of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system. Such a level 
should be achieved within a time-frame suffi-
cient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change, to ensure that food production 
is not threatened and to enable economic devel-
opment to proceed in a sustainable manner.
This is an ambitious, long-term objective, with a con-
crete component referring to stabilization of GHG con-
centrations, and a more abstract – but no less impor-
tant – component referring to ecosystem protection, 
agricultural viability and sustainable development. 
Nonetheless, the Article 2 objective falls far short of 
being an operational definition. It does not explicitly 
specify what stabilized concentration level should be 
adopted, what constitutes ‘dangerous anthropogenic 
interference’, or what time-frame would be consistent 
with ecosystem preservation, agricultural viability and 
sustainable development.
It is difficult to define adequacy in terms that can eas-
ily be translated into constraints on society’s GHG-
emitting activities – in part because there is such a 
long and indirect causal chain: from such activities, 
to the build-up of atmospheric GHG concentrations, 
to radiative forcing, to temperature rise, to ‘dangerous 
anthropogenic interference’ with the climate system. 
The definition of adequacy is further complicated by 
the fact that it inherently entails a long-term perspec-
tive whose timeframe has no precedent in other mul-
tilateral environmental agreements. This long-term 
nature of the climate challenge arises from multiple 
factors: the inertia of socio-economic, technological, 
and political systems, the long atmospheric residence 
time of GHGs, the inertia of the climate system, and 
the widespread, enduring, and unpredictable nature 
of the ecological and societal repercussions of climate 
change. 
Thankfully, there is no absolute need to precisely 
define a long-term emissions trajectory and irrevoca-
bly commit to it. What is needed in this case, however, 
are concrete near- and mid-term objectives. Given that 
we are being forced to make decisions under consid-
erable uncertainty, these near- and mid-term objec-
tives should: (i) be consistent with our current best 
judgement regarding the mitigation actions that will 
be needed over the long term; (ii) not preclude courses 
of actions that might ultimately prove necessary; (iii) 
be flexible and adaptive, since scientific and techno-
economic uncertainties may remain unresolved until 
long after we need to embark upon substantial mitiga-
tion action; and (iv) be coupled with an agreed process 
for periodically revisiting and revising these objectives 
as new information becomes available. 
Given these requirements, what may climate science 
as currently understood tell us about a provisional 
definition of adequacy that can inform our near-term 
objectives? Four key relevant observations are consid-
ered here. 
Equity in the Greenhouse – the Report
11SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE ON EQUITY IN THE GREENHOUSE
 
a) Human civilization has evolved during a period of 
mild and constant climate
Compared to this, the projected human-induced cli-
mate change is unprecedented and could cause enor-
mous adverse impacts. Paleoclimatic research tells 
us that the earth’s climate has remained remarkably 
consistent over the entire time period during which 
human civilization has evolved. Average global tem-
perature over the millennium prior to the industrial 
era has varied by only a fraction of a degree. Paleo-
climatic research also tells us that dramatic climatic 
changes – such as the onset of an ice age – are associated 
with global temperature changes of less than 10ºC. In 
light of this paleoclimatic information, the 21st cen-
tury warming of 1.4–5.8ºC projected for the range 
of emission scenarios explored by the IPCC clearly 
presents an unprecedented climatic risk in the his-
tory of human civilization (IPCC 2001a).1 Significant 
ecological and social damage would occur even at the 
lower end of the IPCC’s range of projected warming. 
The IPCC analysis of impacts expressed this graphi-
cally, as shown in Figure 1. 
Of the many existing analyses regarding the impacts 
of climate change (see IPCC 2001b), highlighting a 
few representative results will suffice to indicate the 
magnitude of the threat. 
• The viability of key ecosystems is put at risk by 
a temperature change of only 1–2ºC, including 
coral reefs, arctic ecosystems, and coastal wetlands 
(IPCC 2001b).
• Recent study of habitats of about 1100 species 
suggests that a warming of 2ºC could lead to 
the extinction of 24% of species (Thomas et al. 
2004).
• A warming of 2.5ºC would confront some three 
billion additional people with water stress. 
(Hare 2003)
• The Greenland ice sheet, which contains sufficient 
water to raise sea levels by about seven meters, 
would become unstable with a local warming of 
3ºC2 (IPCC 2001a).
Figure 1: Risks of climate change damages at different levels of global temperature change
Source: IPCC (2001a)
1 The projected warming is based on diverse families of socio-economic scenarios that assume no measures are taken to 
protect the climate. It is in addition to the ~0.6º warming that has occurred over the 20th century.
2 Local warming over Greenland is estimated by global climate models to be 1.2 to 3.1 times greater than the global average 
temperature rise.
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Adverse impacts will fall disproportionately on poor, 
already-stressed communities, because of their higher 
sensitivity to climate disruptions and lower capacity 
to adapt, and more limited resources with which to 
mitigate the impacts.
b) Human activities could trigger abrupt climate 
change
Paleoclimatic information has also taught us that 
abrupt climate changes have happened in the past, 
and that the climate system is inherently chaotic, sen-
sitively balanced, and threshold-laden. Even a slow and 
gradual forcing can trigger an abrupt shift to a new 
state at a rate determined by the climate system itself. 
The paleoclimatic record shows that regional climate 
has abruptly shifted by as much as 8–16ºC in as little 
as a decade (Alley et al. 2003). Such climatic changes 
have been linked to shifts in the strength and patterns 
of the thermohaline circulation (i.e. the global ocean 
currents, which are driven by temperature and salin-
ity gradients). The thermohaline circulation is already 
being observed to be affected by ongoing climate 
change (Dickson et al. 2002).
c) Uncertainty regarding the magnitude of impacts is 
large and may remain for decades
For a given level of GHG emissions, the resulting 
amount of warming is not well known. (Conversely, 
for a given amount of warming, the allowable level 
of GHG emissions is similarly uncertain.) For exam-
ple, climate scientists can say only that the amount of 
warming that would result if atmospheric CO2 levels 
rose to twice their preindustrial levels is probably 
somewhere between 1.5ºC and 4.5ºC. This is a discon-
certingly wide range of uncertainty, given how rapidly 
adverse impacts mount with increase in temperature. 
This broad range in estimates of the climate sensi-
tivity complicates the process of identifying a con-
centration at which to stabilize atmospheric GHG 
levels. Global CO2 emission trajectories, as shown 
in Figure 2, depend sensitively on the desired sta-
bilization levels. Especially in the case of the lower 
stabilization trajectories (450 ppm and 550 ppm), 
global emissions deviate sharply from business-
as-usual scenarios, implying significant mitigation 
activity starting immediately. It is important to 
note that stabilizing at these levels would mean that 
mitigation activity would need to start well before 
the uncertainty in the climate sensitivity has been 
resolved. 
As an example, Figure 3 illustrates how significantly 
this uncertainty in the climate sensitivity affects the 
stabilization target that would be required to keep 
warming within a target of 2ºC. The trajectory cor-
responding to the high-end climate sensitivity of 4.5º 
is radically lower than the trajectory corresponding 
to the low-end climate sensitivity of 1.5º. This uncer-
tainty results from the complexity of the various feed-
back processes that act to amplify the warming influ-
ence of GHG increases. We cannot assume that this 
uncertainty will be resolved in the near future.
d) Dramatic GHG reductions would not be 
prohibitively costly
Even trajectories that imply dramatic emission reduc-
tions do not necessarily imply exorbitant costs. In an 
analysis that drew upon projections of mitigation costs 
consistent with conventional macroeconomic analy-
ses, Schneider and Azar (2002) showed that the total 
cost of mitigation would remain a very small fraction 
of the growing global economy, as shown in Figure 4.3 
The ten-fold increase in the global economy would not 
be compromised even by the most stringent stabiliza-
tion targets of 350 ppm, and the point at which the 
global economy would reach its 2100 level according 
to business-as-usual projections would be delayed by 
only a few years.
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Figure 2: Global CO2 emission trajectories for 
different stabilisation levels
Source: IPCC (2001a)
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In light of these above four factors, a straightforward 
cost-benefit analysis is an unsuitable policy tool for 
defining what is ‘adequate’ climate protection. First, 
it is impossible to calculate the costs of a disrupted 
climate because we cannot with good confidence 
project the magnitude of the impacts, given the exist-
ing climatic science uncertainties. Second, the danger 
of improbable but catastrophic damages is not dealt 
with well by cost-benefit analysis, because future risks 
are discounted to the point of being inconsequential 
and because the trigger points for the low-probabil-
ity events are not well understood. Third, even if the 
damages were well understood, not all costs of climate 
change can be measured in strict financial terms, since 
they include damages such as species extinction, loss of 
human life and adverse human health impacts. Finally, 
there is no clear way within a strict cost-benefit frame-
work to balance costs and benefits, as those suffering 
the costs and those enjoying the benefits are separated 
internationally and inter-generationally.
As an alternative to cost-benefit analysis, many have 
urged an approach that defines adequacy in terms of 
an allowable threshold of warming, which would be 
reviewed and revised as understanding about the global 
climate system improves. Figure 5 shows various sta-
bilization scenarios along with best estimates of their 
resulting global temperature increases, with the ranges 
given by the uncertainty in climate sensitivity (of 1.5ºC 
to 4.5ºC for a doubling of CO2 concentrations). The line 
designated (a) shows the range of variability during the 
millennium preceding the industrial era, for reference. 
The line designated (b) shows that it is possible to limit 
warming to 2ºC if atmospheric CO2 concentrations are 
stabilized at 450 ppm, providing the climate sensitivity 
turns out to be toward the low end of its range of uncer-
tainty. It also shows that if climate sensitivity turns out 
to be toward the upper end of its range of uncertainty, 
that the same 450 ppm stabilization trajectory could 
result in a global temperature rise exceeding 4°C.
Many scientific and political institutions have pro-
posed that the term ‘dangerous’ be defined for pur-
poses of Article 2 as a temperature increase above 2ºC 
compared to pre-industrial levels, including the Euro-
pean Union (EU 2002), the German Advisory Council 
Figure 3: Required CO2 emissions trajectories for 
a 2°C target according to climate sensitivity 
Source: Caldeira et al. (2003)
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Figure 4: Mitigation costs of different stabiliza-
tion targets relative to global economic output
Source: Schneider & Azar (2002)
3 The cost projections were based on pessimistic assumptions in the following sense: (i) they do not count any economic 
benefits of preventing climate change, (ii) they do not count any ancillary benefits of reducing GHG emissions (e.g. pollution 
reduction), (iii) they assume for the 550, 450, and 350 ppm trajectories relatively high average abatement costs of $200/
tC, $300/tC, and $400/tC, respectively, and no ‘no-regrets’ abatement options, as is consistent with typical macroeconomic 
models such as DICE.
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on Global Change (WBGU 2003), and the Climate 
Action Network (CAN 2002). This is consistent with 
the precautionary principle as expressed in Article 3 of 
the Climate Convention: 
The Parties should take precautionary measures 
to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of 
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. 
Where there are threats of serious or irrevers-
ible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing 
such measures, taking into account that poli-
cies and measures to deal with climate change 
should be cost-effective so as to ensure global 
benefits at the lowest possible cost. 
In view of this guidance, aiming at developmment 
below 2°C appears to be reasonable, at least for the 
meantime, considering the four factors discussed 
above:
1. A temperature rise of 2°C is highly likely to have 
significant adverse climate impacts.
2. Climate science cannot yet tell us with any cer-
tainty that a temperature increase exceeding 2°C 
will not produce ‘serious or irreversible damage’. 
3. There is considerable uncertainty in the tempera-
ture rise that would actually result, even if our best 
estimates suggest we are on a ‘2°C trajectory’.
4. It appears possible to embark on this trajectory 
without prohibitive economic losses.
For the sake of argument, let us consider what it would 
imply if the UNFCCC Parties took the global politi-
cal decision to strive to limit temperature rise to 2°C. 
Looking again at Figure 5, we see that the allowed emis-
sion trajectory for a temperature rise of 2°C depends 
strongly on the climate sensitivity. Let us consider 
also, then, that in the acknowledged presence of this 
considerable uncertainty, the Parties took the global 
political decision to embark on an emission trajec-
tory that would be implied by a climate sensitivity 
of T2x = ~2.5° (which is slightly optimistic relative to 
the current best estimate). This would imply a stabi-
lization level of approximately 450 ppm. A trajectory 
consistent with this definition of adequacy is shown in 
Figure 6, along with three of the IPCC’s Special Report 
on Emission Scenarios business-as-usual scenarios for 
comparison.
Figure 5: Stabilisation scenarios and resulting temperature increases for different climate sensitivities 
Source: Azar & Rhode (1997)
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The 2°C path shows global emissions peaking by 2020 
at less than 10 GtC/yr. Two implications of this trajec-
tory should be mentioned. First, this adequacy target 
does commit the Earth to significant climate change, 
and carries the risk of severe climate change if the cli-
mate sensitivity turns out to be at the high end of the 
uncertainty range (giving rise to perhaps 4°C tempera-
ture rise). Adaptation measures therefore would have 
to be undertaken, starting in the near-term, which 
raises the issues of compensation and liability. Second, 
this target poses an unprecedented global challenge. 
A rather profound infrastructural transition would 
be needed to allow global emissions to peak by 2020. 
The complexity and cost of this transition grow with 
each passing year of business-as-usual development, 
as society continues to invest in capital that embodies 
a commitment to years or even decades of continued 
GHG emissions: vehicles with 10 year lifetimes, indus-
trial facilities with 30 year lifetimes, homes and office 
buildings with 100 year lifetimes, and urban/peri-
urban development patterns with almost indefinite 
lifetimes. Facilitating the development of the South 
along a low-GHG path starting in the very near future 
is an intrinsic part of meeting the climate challenge. 
This points to the central role of equity in the climate 
challenge.
1.2 Equity
1.2.1 Equity imperatives
Equity is fundamental to the climate challenge for four 
chief reasons. 
Legal imperative: Parties are legally bound by the Cli-
mate Convention to seek an equitable climate regime, 
as Article 3 makes clear: ‘The Parties should protect 
the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and 
in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities.’
Moral imperative: Citizens of a global community 
face a moral compulsion to engage on the basis of 
justice and equity. As global interconnectedness grows 
through globalisation and shared environmental and 
geopolitical challenges, the moral imperative becomes 
further strengthened. As our capacity to adversely 
affect the environment grows global, long-term, and 
irreversible, this moral imperative has also become 
further strengthened and extended to future genera-
tions. 
Political imperative: The climate challenge requires a 
global effort. The nature of the problem does require 
some countries to lead and to explore the way into a 
fossil-free future, but at some point all major polluters 
of the planet, from North and South, must be part of 
this effort. However, in most cases countries will only 
participate if they perceive the climate regime to be 
equitable. 
Practical imperative: The challenge of climate change 
may only be practically resolvable if equity – in its 
strongest sense – is addressed. Both pillars of address-
ing the climate challenge – mitigation and adapta-
tion – rely on a fundamental recognition of equity 
and sustainable development (see section 1.3). The 
practical imperative inextricably merges the sustain-
able development goals of the South with the global 
climate challenge (Shukla et al. 2002).
It is the last of these four imperatives that is most 
compelling. After all, countries have been known 
to abandon international treaties, thus proving the 
legal imperative weak; countries have so far been 
unmoved to address global poverty, thus proving the 
moral imperative weak; and countries are often able 
to achieve geopolitical objectives through coercive 
means, thus proving the political imperative weak. 
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Figure 6: The 450 ppm stabilization path, and a 
high (A2), mid-range (A1B), and low (B1) Special 
Report on Emission Scenarios scenario
Source: Based on data from IPCC (1999) and ScenGen model
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1.2.2 Situating equity in the climate challenge
Equity arises in the climate regime with respect to 
four broad themes. As the need for serious mitiga-
tion effort intensifies and as the impacts of climate 
change become ever more visible, addressing these 
equity dimensions will grow increasingly complex and 
increasingly important for the implementation of an 
effective climate regime. 
Mitigation and burden-sharing
Attaining the trajectory shown in Figure 6 will require 
near-global participation. Not only must emissions in 
the wealthier North (Annex I countries) be curtailed 
radically, but emissions in the poorer South (non-
Annex I countries) as well must diverge considerably 
from a conventional, fossil-intensive and highly GHG-
emitting development trajectory. The required global 
resolve will only materialize, however, if an equitable 
framework is offered that acknowledges the disparity 
among nations in historic and continuing emissions. 
It would also recognize that the world’s majority lives 
in poverty, and relief from poverty entails an increase 
in energy services and an unavoidable near-term rise 
in carbon emissions. This is another challenge for the 
North – to foster low-carbon technology in the South-
ern hemisphere in order to leapfrog the fossil fuel 
intensive stage of economic development. The Extrac-
tive Industries Review process of the World Bank has 
shown one way of fostering this development: accord-
ing to the review, the World Bank should stop financ-
ing fossil fuel technologies and divert the money into 
renewables and efficiency measures (Salim 2003). To 
be sure, certain near-term carbon reduction measures 
can also provide development co-benefits. But until a 
decent standard of living is reached, the world’s poor 
majority will defer investments in ambitious reduc-
tions, even as its aggregate emissions grow and exceed 
those of the wealthy minority. 
Any proposed burden-sharing scheme can be exam-
ined explicitly and quantitatively in terms of the 
desired emission trajectory. The trajectories illus-
trated in Figure 7 show an illustrative burden-sharing 
arrangement. For simplicity, it aggregates all countries 
into ‘North’ and ‘South’ even though there are clear 
and important differences among the countries within 
in each of these admittedly coarse groupings. (In chap-
ters 2 and 3 of this report, more attention is paid to 
defining useful, operational, disaggregated categories 
of countries.) 
In this burden-sharing agreement, the emissions 
from the North undergo a steady and rapid decline 
starting immediately (decreasing by more than half 
by mid-century, and halving again by the end of the 
century). The South initially increases emissions, as is 
demanded by its development needs, and by the cen-
tury’s end reaches the same per capita emissions rate as 
the North. This suggests two provisional conclusions 
bearing strongly on the issue of equity:
1. Emissions from the South will need to start to 
decrease in the fairly near future despite dra-
matic reductions being undertaken in the North.4 
Proposals that aim to address equity concerns 
by offering ‘growth-targets’ (i.e. allocations that 
allow continued increases in emissions) for all 
Southern Parties that last more than a very limited 
period into the future (about 10 or 20 years) may 
not be consistent with any reasonable definition 
of adequacy. This is particularly true for newly 
industrialised and rapidly industrialising develop-
ing countries (see sections 2.3 and 3.1). However, 
for some least developed countries, absolute emis-
sions are so low that mitigation will likely only be 
required beyond this time-frame.
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Figure 7: Potential emissions trajectories in 
North and South consistent with a 450 ppm 
stabilization path.
Source: Based on IPCC (1999); ScenGen model; UN (2003)
4  In fact, even if the North just disappeared today along with its vast GHG emissions, the South would still have a major climate 
problem on its hands and would not be able to continue to increase emissions for long.
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2. Additionally, the fact that continued development 
in the South is a fundamental priority that must 
not be sacrificed to the requirements of climate 
protection, presents an extraordinary dual chal-
lenge. Substantial financial and technical transfers 
from the North will be necessary to enable the 
degree of mitigation effort required in the South 
to protect the climate while enabling development. 
In other words, substantial transfers to the South 
are necessitated by practical considerations of pro-
tecting the climate, whether or not such transfers 
are warranted by equity considerations. 
Especially in the context of vastly different negotiat-
ing capacities among nations, a continuation of the ad 
hoc burden-sharing approach exemplified by Kyoto is 
assured of being inequitable. An equitable approach 
requires coherent and comprehensible principles, 
transparently applied. Many have argued that the 
rights to use the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere 
should be allocated equally, because emissions of car-
bon are directly linked to engagement in economic 
activities and enjoyment of products and services (i.e. 
carbon is embedded in capital and consumptive goods, 
given today’s technologies), and hence to human wel-
fare. The challenge then is to define a common prop-
erty management system that distributes equitably the 
benefits of this common property resource. 
Impacts, compensation and liability
Impacts of climate change, which communities are 
already feeling, will continue to accelerate even if a 2°C 
trajectory is attained. These impacts will fall dispro-
portionately on the South, while the causes are prima-
rily Northern. This is reflected in the continuing and 
persistent efforts of the Southern negotiators to make 
adaptation a priority item on the negotiating agenda, 
especially since COP 6b in 2001 (see section 2.2), and 
this focus will only intensify as impacts are more keenly 
felt. Equitably addressing this issue will entail provid-
ing resources for adaptation and addressing claims for 
climate-related damages that warrant relief. 
Capacity to engage politically
An equitable process (i.e. procedural equity) is a pre-
condition for an equitable outcome. Yet there are cur-
rently vast disparities among the Parties in negotiating 
strength that preclude an equitable process (e.g. non-
Annex I Parties were not granted sufficient financial 
resources to ensure that each country can send at least 
one delegate to attend SB-18 in 2003). The lopsid-
edness has so far been tolerated because the major 
obligations of the climate regime to date have fallen 
on the North. Unremedied, however, these dispari-
ties in negotiating capacity will make it increasingly 
difficult for developing countries to have a sense of 
ownership of the evolving climate regime, especially as 
the impacts of climate change are felt, the mitigation 
requirements increase, and a broader burden-sharing 
regime is needed. Significant capacity building assist-
ance and resources, well beyond those already pro-
vided, will be required if the countries of the South are 
to engage confidently in the subsequent stages of the 
climate regime. An important aspect of this capacity 
building is to enhance the scientific and technical 
capacity for assessing climate change, its impacts, and 
response options. 
Intranational equity
Intranational equity is a cross-cutting theme. Over-
whelmingly, equity as discussed in the climate context 
is implicitly viewed at the international level. However, 
as the disparities among nations are echoed within 
nations, equity issues relating to climate are no less 
profound at the intranational level (Ott/Sachs 2002). 
Many of the distinctions made above between North 
and South hide the large differences (and at times, 
inequalities) within these (groups of) countries. Vul-
nerability is primarily experienced at the local level, 
implying that resource transfer should aim not only at 
poor countries, but also vulnerable and poor commu-
nities. A specific problem arises in defining a just tran-
sition for communities that are dependent for their 
livelihoods on fossil fuel resources or forestry. 
1.3 Sustainable development – framework for 
mitigation and adaptation
Both pillars of addressing the climate challenge – miti-
gation and adaptation – rely on a fundamental rec-
ognition of equity and sustainable development. Fig-
ure 8 gives a way of looking at the overlap between 
mitigation, adaptation and development (by which is 
normally meant short-term economic development 
only) where the interface between the three is rather 
small. However, if the notion of development were 
to be broadened to include sustainable development 
(incorporating both a longer term perspectives as well 
as non-economic factors) then it is likely that both 
mitigation as well as adaptation actions will both over-
lap with each other more as well as with sustainable 
development.
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Mitigation involves the development and diffusion 
of advanced technologies, habitat preservation and 
population stabilization. These aims are impossible 
to achieve without institutions, policies, and meas-
ures that enable economic and cultural development 
of the poorest and support the legitimate aspiration of 
people toward enhancement of human welfare. Simi-
larly, adaptation involves creating the conditions for 
adaptation to climate change, supporting resiliency 
of local communities by enhancing human welfare, 
and fostering sustainable livelihoods particularly in 
the poorest and most vulnerable communities.
For adaptation, the most relevant literature is that 
which recognises that both adaptation and mitigation 
do not occur as discrete activities but often occur as 
part of continuing activities. Countries anyway take 
measures to cope with natural climate variability, and 
are continually investing in activities (such as energy 
supply) that may emit more or less GHGs. Analysis 
therefore is most realistic when it recognises that many 
adaptation and mitigation options involve adjusting 
the orientation of ongoing investment and other 
activities (‘mainstreaming’), rather than being discrete 
actions with easily separated costs and benefits. Some 
of the most effective action on adaptation is to support 
more sustainable development. 
Similarly, mitigation approaches that emphasise 
sustainable development (e.g. sustainable development 
policies and measures – SD-PAMs) are particularly 
attractive to developing countries (Winkler et al. 
2002b). In meeting basic development needs, different 
paths are possible, and the aim of SD-PAMs is to shift 
toward a more sustainable path of development. Such 
a path, although not motivated by climate policy, will 
have lower GHG emissions, as shown by the Special 
Report on Emission Scenarios (IPCC 2001c). 
The importance of sustainable development, and its 
relationship to climate change, has long been recog-
nized in the UNFCCC process. Article 3.4 of the Con-
vention states as a principle that: 
Parties have a right to, and should, promote 
sustainable development. Policies and measures 
to protect the climate system against human-
induced change should be appropriate to the 
specific condition of each Party and should 
be integrated with national development pro-
grammes, taking into account that economic 
development is essential for adopting measures 
to address climate change.
By taking such a sustainable development approach 
to analysing both mitigation as well as adaptation it 
should be possible to examine a larger pool of poten-
tial win-win options and policies. Both aspects of the 
climate challenge must be addressed in the context of 
development.
The literature and scientific analysis on adaptation and 
mitigation to date has tended to treat them as separate 
domains, with very little overlap. The main excep-
tions in the analytic literature have been attempts to 
construct global ‘cost-benefit’ analysis. It is difficult 
to integrate both mitigation and adaptation within a 
common analytical framework because of the differ-
ences in both geographic and time scales relevant to 
each domain. Mitigation action is needed in the short 
term to provide long-term benefits (over decades), 
while adaptation in the near term has short-to-long-
term consequences. On geographic scales, mitigation 
requires local action but has global climatic benefits 
and local co-benefits, while adaptation is local in terms 
of both the action and its benefits. 
The relationship between adaptation and mitigation 
needs to be understood not as alternatives, but rather 
as a mix which will require analysis and judgement to 
inform the appropriate combination. Nevertheless, in 
general the more mitigation there is, the less will be 
the impacts to which we will have to adjust, and the 
less the risks for which we will have to try and pre-
pare. Conversely, the greater the degree of preparatory 
adaptation, the less may be the impacts associated with 
any given degree of climate change. Regionally, the 
appropriate mix may vary, but almost all regions are 
likely to be engaged in some of both kinds of activity. 
A focus on sustainable development provides the basis 
for such a combination. 
Figure 8: Linking mitigation and adaptation in 
the framework of sustainable development
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To make this practical for the climate negotiations, 
synergies and trade-offs at local, national and interna-
tional level need to be identified. There will be a set of 
developing win-win or synergistic projects, which can 
address both mitigation as well as adaptation. These 
are especially evident in the land-use sector where 
enhancing land-use with tree cover can be both ben-
eficial for mitigation as well as adaptation. However, 
many projects will be driven by adaptation or mitiga-
tion in particular. At the local or project level, one 
might distinguish between the following: 
• Mitigation-driven actions: These may in turn 
either have (a) positive adaptation consequences 
(e.g. carbon sequestration projects with positive 
drought preparedness aspects) or (b) negative 
adaptation consequences (e.g if heavy depend-
ence on a variable energy source (e.g. wind, hydro, 
solar) increases the sensitivity of energy supply to 
weather variations).
• Adaptation-driven actions: These may also have 
both (a) positive consequences for mitigation (e.g. 
coastal mangrove plantations to build resilience to 
coastal storms will also sequester carbon) or (b) 
negative consequences for mitigation (e.g. large 
dams for water storage, or other large infrastruc-
ture projects for protection of people may result 
in enhanced emissions during the construction 
periods).
• Non-climate-driven actions: In many cases actions 
will be taken for reasons which have nothing to 
do with either mitigation or adaptation (i.e. are 
unrelated to climate considerations) but may have 
considerable consequences for either (or both) 
mitigation as well as adaptation (e.g. deforesta-
tion for agriculture or other purposes results in 
loss of carbon as well as loss of ecosystems and the 
resilience of local populations). 
The last category will contain many sustainable devel-
opment policies. Considering which sectors projects 
fall into will assist in identifying synergies and trade-
offs. Mitigation and adaptation actions and policies 
within nations relate to inherently different sectors 
(although there is some overlap). Thus, for example, 
mitigation actions usually relate to energy, industry 
and transport sectors in most countries. The most 
vulnerable sectors (and hence the ones where adap-
tation actions will need to be taken) are usually the 
agriculture, land use, forestry, water and coastal zone 
management sectors. 
Since solutions to the climate change problem are pur-
sued internationally through the Climate Convention 
and with quantified commitments for many indus-
trialised countries through the Kyoto Protocol, it is 
necessary to analyse the global/international dimen-
sion of both mitigation as well as adaptation. Both 
are response strategies against the problem of climate 
change.
One notion that underlies much global analysis is to 
seek a cost/benefit optimum for comparing mitiga-
tion against adaptation actions. This is a very difficult 
notion to determine in the abstract because it involves, 
inter alia, uncertainties on the science and economics 
of long-term impacts, complexities of risk manage-
ment, valuation of non-market goods, differences of 
scale and ethical judgements on ‘who pays for what’. 
The latter issue is particularly complex and sensitive 
since most analyses envisage that the costs of mitiga-
tion will occur (at least initially) in the more developed 
and richer countries while the costs of impacts (or 
mitigation in-action) will be borne largely (but not 
exclusively) in the poorer countries of the developing 
world. 
One of the greatest challenges in the years ahead will 
be the integration of mitigation and adaptation within 
a common analytical framework at the international 
level, and for the development of opportunities for 
synergistic projects at the local level, oriented towards 
sustainable development.
2 Responses to the climate 
challenge
Mitigation and adaptation have been recognized as 
both being responses to the problem of anthropogenic 
climate change. However, mitigation is the key meas-
ure to address its root cause, namely GHG emissions. 
While some adaptation will be necessary to deal with 
climate change to which the world is already commit-
ted, ultimately mitigation is the best form of adapta-
tion (Yohe 2001). Adaptation will become increasingly 
difficult (and more costly), the less mitigative action 
is taken – and some adverse impacts such as the loss 
of rare species or the melting of glaciers cannot be 
reclaimed by adaptation measures at all.
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2.1 Mitigation
Mitigation activities means reducing or limiting emis-
sion of GHGs into the atmosphere. The focus of the 
ultimate objective of the UNFCCC in Article 2, namely 
‘to achieve stabilization of GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere’, indicates a consensus among parties to 
take action for mitigation. Therefore, the problem 
the world is facing is not whether or not mitigation 
is important, but who mitigates and how much. Long 
multilateral negotiations in the last fourteen years 
were mainly on burden-sharing among countries for 
mitigation, and this will continue to be a central part 
of debates in future climate negotiation.
2.1.1 Deep cuts in the North 
Annex I countries must continue to take the lead in 
reducing GHG emissions, for several reasons that are 
linked to the criteria outlined in section 2.3. Firstly, 
from the point of responsibility, Annex I countries 
are responsible for the majority of GHG emissions 
in the past, which has caused current climate change. 
Emissions per capita of Annex I countries are gen-
erally much larger than those of non-Annex I coun-
tries, which means that individuals living in Annex I 
countries have more responsibility than those living 
in non-Annex I countries. From an equity perspective, 
each individual living today and in the future has a 
right to use the same amount of service from the 
atmosphere. It would be patently inequitable if 
the Annex I countries, by virtue of being wealthier 
and consuming more fossils fuels both historically 
and currently, depleted the atmosphere’s rapidly 
diminishing capacity to serve as a safe sink for GHG 
emissions. Hence, Parties agreed in Marrakesh that 
Annex I Parties should reduce ‘emissions in a manner 
conducive to narrowing per capita differences between 
developed and developing country Parties’ (UNFCCC 
2001a).
Secondly, from the point of capability, most Annex I 
countries are richer than non-Annex I countries, with 
the exception of a few newly industrialized developing 
countries (see definitions in section 2.3). This means 
Annex I countries have more financial capacity 
to pay for mitigation measures. Besides, physical 
infrastructure in Annex I countries is well established 
and there is less need to use highly energy and carbon 
intensive materials for expanding housing, roads or 
other infrastructure. 
Thirdly, from the point of mitigation potential, Annex I 
countries have more ‘luxury’ emissions, compared 
to emissions from activities related to basic human 
needs. For example, reduction of use of automobiles 
in Annex II countries would have less impact on their 
basic human needs than reduction of fuel use for 
cooking in a non-Annex I country. 
Despite the moral and practical necessity of reduction, 
the emissions in many Annex I countries are still 
increasing. According to the latest compilation of 
national communications by the UNFCCC Secretariat, 
GHG emissions from all Annex I countries as a whole 
(excluding land-use change and forestry) decreased 
by 6.6% from 1990 to 2001 (UNFCCC 2003a). Thus 
Annex I Parties have jointly attained the aim of 
Article 4.2 of the Convention. However, the decrease 
was mainly due to a 40% decline in emissions from 
economy-in-transition countries. Emissions from 
Annex II countries have increased by 7.5% over the 
decade. In addition, total GHG emissions from Annex 
I countries are expected to increase by about 10% by 
2010 compared to 1990 levels, even with policies and 
measures (UNFCCC 2003b). 
Considering the above-mentioned reasons, it is clear 
Annex I countries must reduce emissions further. 
Emission targets set by the Kyoto Protocol were only a 
first step in inflecting the curve of growing emissions. 
They should be reconfirmed and strengthened 
in the period after 2012. Some Annex I countries 
have recognised the urgency of action and set more 
ambitious and longer-term targets, e.g. the UK’s energy 
white paper ‘Our energy future’ recommending a 60% 
reduction of industrialised countries’ GHG emissions 
by 2050 (UK 2003), or the German Advisory Coun-
cil on Global Change recommending GHG emissions 
reductions for industrialised countries by at least 20% 
by 2020 (WBGU 2003). 
In addition to the emission reductions that must occur 
within Annex I countries, these countries must also 
provide financial and technological resources to help 
enable what needs to happen in Non-Annex I coun-
tries – development with low emissions.
2.1.2 Development with low emissions
Based on the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’, emissions 
from non-Annex I countries have not been subject 
to quantitative emission commitment up to now. 
While the primary responsibility of Annex I coun-
tries is widely accepted, it is clear that emissions from 
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non-Annex I countries have been rapidly increasing. 
According to data from the World Resources Institute,5 
CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in developing 
countries have increased 38.9% over the 1990-2000 
period, resulting in a share of 40% of annual global 
emissions in 2000 (WRI 2003). At the same time, some 
non-Annex I countries have also rapidly developed 
in terms of economy. GDP per capita of NICs such 
as Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Qatar is 
getting close to – or exceeding – the level of some 
Annex I countries. It appears reasonable to assume 
that responsibility, capacity, and capability of those 
countries to take mitigation actions are increasing as 
those countries become further industrialised. 
In order for the world to achieve the ultimate objec-
tive of the Climate Convention as given in Article 2, 
it is necessary at least for some non-Annex I coun-
tries to start taking mitigation activities to limit their 
GHG emissions. As non-Annex I countries (other than 
NICs) are still on their way to meeting the welfare 
needs of their populations, limitations on emissions 
must not require sacrificing sustainable development. 
This implies two things. First, every opportunity 
should be taken to decouple emission growth from 
economic growth, by relying on more efficient and 
lower-GHG technologies and processes, thereby ena-
bling non-Annex I countries to leapfrog the GHG-
intensive development path taken by the Annex I coun-
tries. Second, to the extent that mitigation activities 
in non-Annex I countries require additional financial 
and technological resources, these resources should be 
provided by those countries who have the capability 
and the responsibility to do so, i.e. Annex I countries. 
A concrete meaning of de-coupling, or development 
with low emission, will differ from country to country 
according to their national circumstances, including 
geographical circumstances and level of economic 
development. Similarly, the appropriate magnitude of 
financial and technological resources to enable that 
decoupling will also depend on national circumstances. 
There is a large diversity among non-Annex I countries 
in terms of national circumstances, as reflected in 
the wide range of values against all criteria shown 
in Table 1. Each non-Annex I country has its own 
development objectives and the most suitable way to 
achieve low-emitting development paths.
In climate negotiations, however, non-Annex I coun-
tries seek the solidarity of a consolidated negotiating 
group called ‘G 77 & China’. Given the diversity of 
this group, it is becoming more and more difficult to 
achieve a unified position (see section 3.2). Arguably, 
researchers are more flexible than negotiators to start 
working on how to adequately reflect divergence of 
non-Annex I countries into their climate mitigation 
policies. 
LDCs are concerned both with ‘development’ and with 
adaptation, with little interest in or responsibility for 
mitigation even in the medium term. On the other 
hand, several non-Annex I countries are in a proc-
ess of rapid industrialization. Some have even reached 
levels of development that have earned them the title 
of ‘newly industrialised’. Both NICs and RIDCs have 
been facing various issues such as serious local air pol-
lution, human health hazards, high energy cost, and 
rapid urbanization. In this context, many mitigation 
policies will be beneficial to solve local environmen-
tal problems, and contribute to sustainable develop-
ment. 
2.2 Adaptation 
2.2.1 Responses to adaptation to date – Convention, 
Protocol, Marrakech, Delhi and Milan 
The issue of adaptation to climate change is closely 
related to the impacts of climate change and hence also 
to the vulnerability to those impacts. While adapta-
tion has been relatively neglected, as compared to the 
issue of mitigation, discussions have gained momen-
tum in the last few years. The commitment of the Par-
ties to appropriate responses to adaptation needs is 
enshrined in the Convention text (see Mace 2003; Ver-
heyen 2002). First, adaptation is part of the ultimate 
objective of the Convention. It appears in the second 
sentence (which is often forgotten) of Article 2 as fol-
lows (emphasis added):
The ultimate objective of this Convention (…) 
is to achieve (…) stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Such a 
level should be achieved within a time-frame 
5 Compilation of all national communication from non-Annex I countries by the Secretariat is not yet available as not all non-
Annex I countries have submitted their first national communication.
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sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally 
to climate change, to ensure food production is 
not threatened and enable economic develop-
ment to proceed in a sustainable manner.’ 
Furthermore, Convention principles outlined in Arti-
cle 3 – another core element of the Convention – call 
for proactive measures to address the adverse impacts 
of climate change (as defined in Article 1). All Parties 
to the Convention have agreed that ‘developed coun-
try Parties should take the lead in combating climate 
change and the adverse effects thereof ’ (Art. 3.1), 
and ‘the specific needs and special circumstances of 
developing country Parties, especially those that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of cli-
mate change (…) should be given full consideration’ 
(Art. 3.2). In addition, Article 3.3 specifically acknowl-
edges the need for Parties to take precautionary meas-
ures to anticipate and mitigate the adverse effects of 
climate change, and stresses that lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as an excuse to postpone 
these measures. 
To reach the ultimate objective of the Convention, 
and operationalise these Convention principles, the 
Parties have agreed specific commitments on adapta-
tion under Article 4. All Parties commit to ‘cooperate 
in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate 
change’ (Art. 4.1e) and to ‘[f]ormulate, implement, 
publish and update’ national ‘programmes contain-
ing measures (…) to facilitate adequate adaptation to 
climate change’ (Art. 4.1b). Under Article 4.3 of the 
Convention, developed country Parties have agreed to 
‘provide new and additional financial resources to meet 
the agreed full costs’ of developing country Parties in 
complying with national communication reporting 
obligations, which in turn require the development 
of national vulnerability and adaptation assessments. 
Developed country Parties have also agreed to ‘pro-
vide such financial resources, including the transfer of 
technology, needed by the developing country Parties 
to meet the agreed full incremental costs of imple-
menting measures that are covered by paragraph 1 of 
this article’ (i.e. Art. 4.1). The implementation of this 
commitment is to take into consideration the need for 
adequacy and predictability in the flow of these funds, 
and the importance of appropriate burden sharing 
among developed country Parties (Art. 4.3). All Par-
ties have further agreed that developing countries that 
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of 
climate change shall be assisted by developed country 
Parties ‘in meeting the costs of adaptation to those 
adverse impacts’ (Art. 4.4). 
In addition, many other Convention articles address 
issues relevant to adaptation, including ‘Research and 
systematic observation’ (Art. 5 in conjunction with 
Art. 4.1g), on ‘Education, training and public aware-
ness’ (Art. 6 in conjunction with Art. 4.1i) and on 
‘Technology Transfer’ (Art. 4.5).
Although the focus of the Kyoto Protocol is on estab-
lishing targets for GHG reductions and mechanisms 
for achieving it, it is also structured to assist in generat-
ing funding to address adaptation needs. Parties to the 
Protocol have agreed, in Article 12.8 of the Protocol, 
‘to ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified 
[CDM] project activities is used (…) to assist develop-
ing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs 
of adaptation’.
Against this backdrop, and with increasingly alarm-
ing projections of the potential impacts of climate 
change on vulnerable communities, adaptation issues 
have increased in prominence in recent climate nego-
tiations. At COP 7 in Marrakech, an Adaptation Fund 
was established under the Kyoto Protocol, to be funded 
in part with the proceeds of the CDM Adaptation Levy. 
Two additional funds, the Special Climate Change 
Fund and the Least Developed Country Fund, were 
established under the Convention, to address a range of 
needs, including adaptation. At COP 8, in New Delhi, 
adaptation played a particularly prominent role. The 
resulting Delhi Ministerial Declaration on Climate 
Change and Sustainable Development made a number 
of references to the issue of adaptation, and declared, 
inter alia, that ‘adaptation to the adverse effects of 
climate change is of high priority for all countries’ and 
that ‘adaptation requires urgent attention and action 
on the part of all countries’ (UNFCCC 2002a). At 
COP 9 in Milan, further progress was made in opera-
tionalising the Special Climate Change Fund, and in 
developing criteria for implementation of priority 
adaptation activities identified by LDCs through the 
National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) 
process, initiated through the Marrakech Accords. 
Despite this progress, much work remains to be done 
to prioritise adaptation needs at the national and 
international levels, and ensure that adequate funding 
is made available to address these needs. 
2.2.2 Adaptation funding
Little funding has been provided to address adaptation 
to the impacts of climate change under the Conven-
tion process. The GEF is the funding mechanism for 
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a number of multilateral environmental agreements, 
including the UNFCCC. Since 1991, the GEF has spent 
over $1.5 billion on climate change project activities. 
The vast majority of this funding has gone to support 
mitigation projects (UNFCCC 2002b). Only a small 
fraction of GEF funding has been spent on adapta-
tion, in the context of enabling activities, rather than 
project activities. The GEF’s climate change focal area 
has four operational programmes, each of which is 
mitigation-related (energy efficiency, renewable 
energy, sustainable transport, and reduction of cost of 
low GHG-emitting technologies). Enabling activities, 
of which adaptation activities are only a subset, have 
represented less than 8% of all funds expended by the 
GEF under its climate change focal area (UNFCCC 
2002b). The extremely low percentage of GEF funding 
directed toward adaptation activities has resulted from 
a lack of strong and clear guidance given by the COP 
to the GEF on adaptation over the years, the staged 
approach taken to adaptation, and the GEF’s operating 
strategy, which includes incremental cost and global 
benefits criteria for project approval. 
In response to continuing developing country frus-
trations with the difficulty of accessing GEF project 
funding, during the COP 6 and COP 6bis negotiations 
the issue of funding adaptation was taken more seri-
ously, and three new funds were floated for adoption: 
the Special Climate Change Fund, Least Developed 
Countries Fund and Adaptation Fund. These funds 
were formally established at COP 7 through the Mar-
rakech Accords (Huq 2002).
Special Climate Change Fund
The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) was estab-
lished to assist developing countries by financing 
activities, programmes and measures that are comple-
mentary to those funded by the climate change focal 
area of the GEF, in four broad areas: 
• adaptation, in accordance with paragraph 8 of 
decision 5/CP.7;
• transfer of technologies;
• energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry 
and waste management;
• activities to assist developing country Parties 
referred to under Article 4, paragraph 8(h), in 
diversifying their economies. (UNFCCC 2001b)
The following adaptation activities are to be supported 
through the SCCF and/or the Adaptation Fund:
• starting to implement adaptation activities 
promptly where sufficient information is available 
to warrant such activities, inter alia, in the areas of 
water resources management, land management, 
agriculture, health, infrastructure development, 
fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosys-
tems, and integrated coastal zone management; 
• improving the monitoring of diseases and vectors 
affected by climate change, and related forecast-
ing and early-warning systems, and in this context 
improving disease control and prevention;
• supporting capacity building for preventative 
measures, planning, preparedness and manage-
ment of disasters relating to climate change, 
including contingency planning, in particular, for 
droughts and floods in areas prone to extreme 
weather events;
• strengthening existing and, where needed, estab-
lishing national and regional centres and infor-
mation networks for rapid response to extreme 
weather events, utilizing information technology 
as much as possible. (UNFCCC 2001b)
The COP’s guidance to the GEF, which provides that 
the above activities will be supported through either the 
SCCF or the Adaptation Fund (‘and/or’), itself raises 
issues regarding the complementarity of these two 
funds, and the longevity of the SCCF (Mace 2003). 
At SB-18 the Parties made slow progress toward the 
operationalisation of the SCCF, through the prioritisa-
tion of the four broad categories of activities for fund-
ing through the SCCF. The Parties agreed that ‘adapta-
tion activities to address the adverse impacts of climate 
change’ were a ‘top priority’ for funding, and that tech-
nology transfer and its associated capacity-building 
activities were ‘also essential’ (UNFCCC 2003c).6 At 
COP 9, the Parties made little further progress in pri-
oritising the activities previously agreed for funding 
through the SCCF. 
As a result of these negotiations, it remains unclear 
how much funding will be available for adaptation, 
or for any of the other categories of activities to be 
addressed by the SCCF.
6  The language ‘adaptation activities to address adverse impacts of climate change’ was used deliberately, to separate these 
activities from those that address the adverse impacts of response measures.
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Least Developed Countries Fund
The Least Developed Country Fund was established 
through the Marrakech Accords to support an LDC 
Work Programme, which includes, among other ele-
ments, the preparation in and by LDCs of National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), a bot-
tom-up, country-driven process, intended to result in 
a list of each country’s most urgent and immediate 
priority adaptation needs (UNFCCC 2001b).
Despite the affirmative commitment undertaken by 
developed country Parties to assist particularly vul-
nerable countries in meeting the costs of adaptation, 
under Article 4.4, and the commitment also made by 
developed country Parties to provide funding through 
the GEF for the implementation of developing country 
commitments under Article 4.1, the LDC Fund is not 
funded by mandatory contributions from Conven-
tion Parties. Only a subset of countries has committed 
funding, and it clear that these funds will be insuffi-
cient to implement the adaptation activities identified 
through the NAPA process. 
COP 9 asked the GEF to support the implementation 
of NAPAs upon their completion, and to take a number 
of elements into account when developing operational 
guidelines for funding NAPA implementation, includ-
ing: ensuring a country-driven approach, consistency 
with national priorities, cost-effectiveness and com-
plementarity with other funding sources, equitable 
access by LDC Parties to funding, and criteria for sup-
porting activities on an agreed full-cost basis, taking 
account of the level of funds available, guidelines for 
expedited support, urgency and immediacy of adapt-
ing to the adverse effects of climate change and priori-
tization of activities.
The ceding of authority by the group of developing 
countries to the GEF, to develop operational guide-
lines for the funding of NAPAs, is in many ways a step 
backwards, and illustrates the negotiating power of 
developed country Parties, as the LDC Fund and work 
programme was born out of frustration that LDCs 
experienced in accessing funding under the GEF.  
Adaptation Fund
The third fund created at COP 7 was the Adaptation 
Fund established under the Kyoto Protocol to sup-
port ‘concrete adaptation projects and programmes in 
developing country Parties that are Parties to the Pro-
tocol’ (UNFCCC 2001b). This fund is to be financed 
from an ‘adaptation levy’ to be placed on all CDM 
projects. In addition Annex I Parties that ‘intend to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol are invited to provide fund-
ing, which will be additional to the share of proceeds 
on clean development mechanism project activities’ 
(UNFCCC 2001b). Thus it is unlikely that this fund 
will receive large-scale funding from this source before 
2008, and the size of the fund will, of course, be largely 
dependent on the size of the CDM market.
In reviewing the funds created under the Marrakech 
Accords, an important point is that while a number 
of Annex II Parties (EU members, Canada, Iceland, 
New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland), declared in 
July 2001 that they would collectively contribute 
$410 million (€ 450 million) per year for climate 
change-related activities by 2005, with this level to be 
reviewed in 2008, it is not clear as yet how these con-
tributions will be used to support the activities of any 
particular fund. The funding to be counted toward 
the pledged total can include contributions to GEF 
climate change-related activities; bilateral and mul-
tilateral funding additional to current levels; funding 
for the SCCF, the LDC Fund, the Adaptation Fund; 
and funding derived from the share of proceeds of the 
CDM following entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol 
(UNFCCC 2001c). 
Thus, while this pledge is a useful starting point, it 
is clear that none of these funds is mandatory, none 
is necessarily to address the adaptation needs it tar-
gets, and none is linked to a predictable and adequate 
stream of adaptation funding. Moreover, while the 
LDC Fund and the SCCF are created under the Con-
vention, the Adaptation Fund has been created under 
the Kyoto Protocol. Hence different groups of coun-
tries may ultimately be contributing to each fund. 
What this means in practical terms, is that adaptation 
funding does not reflect an equitable burden sharing 
arrangement among developed country Parties to the 
Convention. There is at present no clear link between 
GHG emissions, and adaptation funding, particularly 
for countries such as the US that have rejected the 
Kyoto Protocol and that have opted not to contribute 
to the LDC and SCCF.
Challenges for the development of an adequate and 
equitable framework on adaptation include the inter-
play between the various sources of adaptation funding 
(GEF, LDC Fund, SCCF, Adaptation Fund); appropri-
ate burden sharing of adaptation costs among devel-
oped country Parties; the prioritisation of adaptation 
activities among and within developing countries; the 
sufficiency of funding for the projects identified in 
NAPAs and National Communications; the further 
elaboration of specific activities to be addressed by 
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the SCCF; and the development of clear guidance to 
the GEF in connection with adaptation activities.
2.2.3 Insurance mechanisms
Funding and insurance for adaptation needs to be linked 
to responsibility for causing climate change by emitting 
GHGs. The UNFCCC’s ‘polluter pays’ principle needs 
to be operationalised for appropriate burden sharing. 
Adequate and predictable revenue streams are essen-
tial for adaptation funding (with new and additional 
funds). There are various ways to accomplish this.
In 1991 AOSIS proposed the creation of an Interna-
tional Insurance Pool, to compensate victims of global 
sea level rise. The pool was to be funded with contri-
butions based on Parties’ contributions to GHG emis-
sions as well as GDP. This proposal has elements in 
common with a number of other transboundary pol-
lution regimes that use mandatory insurance mecha-
nisms to ensure that victims receive some degree of 
compensation from private sector interests that benefit 
from activities that are inherently risky, and then 
backstop this compensation with contributions from 
national governments acting jointly. The oil spill liabil-
ity regime, in particular, may prove a useful model for 
further exploration, in considering ways to both create 
an income stream for adaptation needs and facilitate 
the internalisation of the true costs of carbon. 
Since the UNFCCC’s workshops on risk assessment 
and insurance in May 2003, a number of insurance-
related actions have been proposed in negotiations at 
SB-18 and SB-19 related to Article 4.8. Among other 
elements, the G-77 and China bloc has proposed draft 
conclusions for the SBI’s consideration (UNFCCC 
2003d).
Tiered national and regional insurance schemes, that 
utilize traditional insurance mechanisms, collective 
loss sharing elements, and global reinsurance mecha-
nisms, may be useful in addressing the impacts of cli-
mate change. These and other innovative risk transfer 
mechanisms can assist developing countries in manag-
ing risk from extreme weather events, aiding recovery 
efforts and contributing to sustainable development. 
At the same time, these mechanisms assist in shar-
ing the burden of responsibility for damages resulting 
from climate change among the broader global com-
munity.
2.3 National circumstances, needs and capabilities
Fairness in dealing with climate change requires that 
differences between countries are taken into account. 
The Convention codifies this in the first principle, 
tying together equity, responsibility and capability:
The Parties should protect the climate system 
for the benefit of present and future genera-
tions of humankind, on the basis of equity and 
in accordance with their common but differen-
tiated responsibilities and respective capabili-
ties. Accordingly, the developed country Par-
ties should take the lead in combating climate 
change and the adverse effects thereof. (Article 
3.1; emphasis added) 
Equity is related to common but differentiated respon-
sibilities, but also to capabilities which will vary accord-
ing to national circumstances and needs. 
2.3.1 Annex I / non-Annex I differentiation
The first consequence of ‘common but differenti-
ated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ is that 
developed countries must take the lead. For the devel-
oped countries, there has already been differentiation 
of emission limitation obligations. In the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, Annex B Parties differentiated their targets rela-
tive to 1990 levels, ranging from a 8% reduction to a 
10% increase. In aggregate, if all Parties ratified and 
met their targets, emissions would be reduced by 5.2% 
below 1990 levels.7  However, commitments contained 
in the Kyoto Protocol are only a first step. Any defini-
tion of adequacy consistent with Article 2 UNFCCC 
will require increased mitigation efforts from virtually 
all countries, i.e. deep emissions cuts in industrialized 
countries and the avoidance of emissions (compared 
to business-as-usual trends) in developing countries, 
and ultimately emissions reductions for some. There-
fore, emission limitation commitments will form a 
central element of any future architecture of the 
climate regime.
Equity, responsibility and capability will be more 
important than ever in shaping a future agreement. 
What is required in thinking beyond 2012 is further 
and more systematic differentiation. There are two 
major purposes for such differentiation. One purpose 
is to enable a more transparent and useful interpreta-
7  This percentage ignores the concessions made on forestry at COP 6bis and COP 7 to enable the Marrakech Accords. Den 
Elzen and De Moor (2001) note that this reduced the effective target to 2.7%. 
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tion of the phrase ‘common but differentiated respon-
sibilities and respective capabilities’ by characterizing 
responsibility and capability in terms of quantified 
parameters such as per capita emissions, GDP per cap-
ita, or other pertinent indicators of national circum-
stances. Doing this will allow the creation of an objec-
tive framework for relating the type of commitment 
expected of a country to its national circumstances, 
as is done in section 3.1 below. The second purpose 
is political, seeking to identify potential members of a 
progressive alliance to promote future climate action. 
National interests of different countries (shaped by, 
for example, climate and heating/cooling needs or 
resource endowments such as fossil fuels or forests) 
would shape such political alliances. This second issue 
is taken up in section 3.2.
The first level of differentiation, that between Annex I 
and non-Annex I remains valid. It is difficult to imag-
ine any action by developing countries if industrial-
ised countries, and particularly the US as the largest 
polluter, do not reduce emissions. Consequently, it 
can be assumed that quantified mitigation targets for 
non-Annex I countries only become binding if the 
major Annex I Parties have binding quantified emis-
sion reduction obligation (QUEROs). Beyond this first 
level of differentiation, however, an equally important 
level of differentiation among non-Annex I countries 
must also be defined in light of the wide diversity of 
national circumstances found within the group of 
non-Annex I countries.
2.3.2 Differentiation among non-Annex I countries 
The differentiation under the Berlin Mandate was 
hardly systematic. While the Triptych approach applied 
internally within the EU was developed precisely in 
recognition of the need for further differentiation, this 
was not applied globally. The challenge in defining an 
adequate and equitable global climate agreement for 
the future is to find ‘a logical, top-down and long-term 
resolution in the context of a political process that is 
inherently illogical, bottom-up and mostly concerned 
with the current or next round of commitments’ 
(Grubb et al. 1999: 273). Differentiation among coun-
tries is a critical element in this process.8 In a nego-
tiating regime characterized by dramatic disparities 
in negotiating resources and geopolitical power, it is 
vitally important that differentiation be deliberated on 
the basis of an open, transparent, analytically-based 
framework rather than relying totally on a non-trans-
parent bargaining process that is highly political and 
oftentimes coercive. It is with the objective of working 
toward such a framework that we outline a transparent 
differentiation proposal in this section. 
We start with the acknowledgement in the UNFCCC 
(Article 3.1) that Parties contributions should reflect 
their responsibility and capability, and to these we add, 
for clarity, another indicator – potential. We propose 
that these three characteristics be integrated into a dif-
ferentiation framework in the follow way:
• Responsibility – as a reflection of a Party’s con-
tribution to the climate problem through historic 
and ongoing GHG emissions.
• Capability – as a reflection of a Party’s financial 
and socio-economic wherewithal to help over-
come the climate problem.
• Potential – as a reflection of the mitigative oppor-
tunities within a Party’s economy to reduce GHG 
emissions or to pre-empt the growth of GHG 
emissions through cleaner development.
For each of these characteristics, we propose that spe-
cific, concrete indicators be used to quantitatively cap-
ture each country’s national situation.
Responsibility may be the most straightforward 
characteristic to capture quantitatively. It has been 
defined in the Brazilian proposal as a country’s con-
tribution to temperature increase (UNFCCC 1997; La 
Rovere et al. 2002). In this analysis, we use the approxi-
mation of cumulative emissions of fossil CO2 over 
the period 1990 to 2000. The relatively recent period 
avoids ‘punishing’ countries for historical emissions, 
when the consequences were less widely known. At 
least since the IPCC’s First Assessment Report in 1990, 
the implications can be said to be well-known inter-
nationally. This indicator is arguably quite generous to 
countries that started to industrialize early and whose 
emissions up to 1990 are significant.
Capability as a criterion recognises the fact that a coun-
try’s capability to reduce emissions might be quite dif-
ferent from its level of responsibility. A country may 
have relatively high responsibility for contributing to 
climate change, but nonetheless be too poor to devote 
8  In this chapter, we consider differentiation primarily in relation to mitigation. The overall package, however, makes clear that 
some groups of countries rightly focus on adaptation. 
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resources toward mitigation and/or it might not have 
access to the needed technologies. Emissions do not 
have to be linked to human development, but under 
given socio-economic and technological conditions, a 
certain level of emissions will be necessary to guarantee 
a decent life for poor people (Pan 2002). We consider 
two indicators of capability, the HDI and GDP per 
capita. The HDI measures the average achievements in 
a country in three basic dimensions of human devel-
opment, life expectancy, literacy and income.9
Potential can be related to three indicators – emissions 
per capita, emissions intensity, and emissions growth 
rate. A high value for CO2/GDP would suggest high 
potential to mitigate. The more efficient an economy 
already is (lower CO2 emissions per unit GDP), the less 
potential there is (at a given cost) to mitigate further 
through efficiency. However, the level of emissions per 
capita needs to be taken into account as well. High per 
capita emissions suggest unsustainable consumption 
patterns, which implies considerable potential to miti-
gate without endangering a basic level of development, 
e.g. by life style changes. Finally, the growth rate of 
absolute emissions gives an idea of whether the rate of 
increase is still high or has already been curbed. 
Arguably, mitigative potential should also reflect 
resource endowments and climate – in particular, 
energy resource endowments (whether a country has 
lots of carbon-intensive resources like coal or renew-
able resources like hydro). However, determining the 
mitigative potential for each country more accurately 
requires an analytical effort that we cannot undertake 
here, but which might be usefully explored further. We 
use the simpler metrics here. 
Quantitatively assessing the indicators for responsi-
bility, capability and potential for all counties clearly 
captures the dramatic differences among them (see 
Table 1), and suggests the different levels of commit-
ments to which an equitable regime should oblige them. 
The current climate regime, which lumps all devel-
oping countries together as non-Annex I, obscures 
the huge variety of countries included in this group. 
While meaningful progress toward a global climate 
solution will require a framework for equitably defin-
ing differentiated roles for non-Annex I countries, 
this differentiation does not imply that non-Annex I 
countries should no longer negotiate together as ‘G77 
and China’, which bloc has served as an important 
means of consolidating and wielding some degree of 
negotiating power. 
Non-Annex I countries cover a very wide range of val-
ues for each of the three criteria, always including very 
low values and sometimes some of the higher values as 
well, as shown in Table 1. Responsibility to mitigate is 
radically lower on average for non-Annex I countries 
than for Annex I countries. The non-Annex I group 
includes all the countries with less than 0.5 t CO2/per-
son emitted between 1990 and 2000,10 but also the 
only country (Qatar) with greater than 500 t CO2/per-
son. For capability as reflected by GDP per capita, non-
Annex I includes the least wealthy country with $ 450 
per person in 2000 (PPP US$), but also two countries 
(Singapore and the United Arab Emirates) whose per 
capita incomes exceed the Annex I average of $22,000. 
Potential to mitigate can be very low, at 17 t CO2/mil-
lion $ GDP, but ranges all the way to the highest value 
across the row of 2 325 t CO2/million $ GDP (again, 
Qatar). 
Given this diversity of national circumstances, there 
is little reason to think that all non-Annex I countries 
should respond in the same manner to the climate 
challenge (see Winkler et al. 2002a). While recognising 
that the G77 remains an important vehicle for solidar-
ity, developing countries will need to identify different 
forms of climate action for different members if the 
climate challenge is to be successfully addressed. 
The process of individual countries announcing 
voluntary commitments has been divisive in the past. 
However, two alternative approaches to single country 
action are possible. One way would be for the G77 as 
a group to put forward a proposal on differentiation, 
possibly phased over time. More promising might be 
an endorsement by the G77 for action by a smaller 
group (e.g. NICs, perhaps also RIDCs).
Groupings of countries can be defined both politi-
cally and analytically. Some political groupings are 
well-established in the climate process. As explained 
in section 2.1 the differentiation between Annex I and 
9 A long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate (with two 
thirds weight) and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (with one third weight); a decent 
standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita (PPP US$) (UNDP 2003).
10 Countries with cumulative emissions from 1990 to 2000 of 0.5 tCO2/person or less include Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Mali 
and Uganda.
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non-Annex I remains valid as the first level of differ-
entiation. On the other end of the spectrum the group 
of LDCs are also well defined by the UN but also the 
Convention, and have recently acted in a concerted 
fashion in the climate negotiations, e.g. in the LDC 
fund for adaptation. 
Besides these two levels of differentiation, the analysis 
here seeks to provide a more analytical base for group-
ings of (developing) countries (see Box 1).11 Countries 
were categorized according to the three criteria men-
tioned above, thereby identifying some new groups, 
such as NICs and RIDCs that are seen particularly 
important in taking the next round of climate negotia-
tions forward. Altogether, non-Annex I countries were 
differentiated in four groups each including countries 
with similar national circumstances (see Annex 1 for 
groups’ composition). This grouping builds the basis 
for the assigning of mitigation and financial transfer 
commitments in section 3.1. 
Box 1: Differentiating non-Annex I countries: Analytical basis of groupings
The process for identifying the groups of NICs and RIDCs started with all non-Annex I countries, as well as Non-Parties to the UNFCCC. 
Using the CAIT (climate analysis indicator tool) (WRI 2003), we created an index combining responsibility, potential and capability 
– equally weighting cumulative emissions per capita, the HDI and an indicator of potential (derived from CO2/GDP and GHG/capita). 
LDCs, which by definition have low potential, low capability and low responsibility, formed a distinct analytical group. The remaining 
non-LDC non-Annex I countries were ranked by this index. 
NICs were identified as those countries with an index value one standard deviation above the mean, i.e. those with the highest aggre-
gate score. Focussing on those non-Annex I countries with a medium index value (mean plus/minus one standard deviation) the next 
level of differentiation identified RIDCs. Those can reasonably be defined as having relatively rapid industrial growth in the last decade 
and relatively high income. Without the latter criteria, some countries with high growth off a very low base would have been included. 
RIDCs were therefore selected from the remaining developing countries, as those with higher per capita GDP-PPP than non-Annex I 
average and with higher than 2 percent annual growth in 1991–2000.12
Finally, the remaining 39 developing countries that are neither NIC/RIDC nor LDC are grouped as ‘other developing countries’. They are 
at a very early stage of industrialisation but are not as poor as those countries defined as ‘less developed’ – just ‘regular’ developing 
countries. All groups’ compositions are listed in Annex 1. 
This process merely identified the groups, not the type of commitment. The types of commitments indicated for each group were 
derived by applying criteria of responsibility, capability and potential using the decision rules in Box 2 (see section 3.1).
11 The discussion on different political interests, however, is dealt with in section 3.2 on political leadership.
12 Due to a lack of GDP data in the early 1990s the period 1995–2000 was used for Bosnia & Herzegovina.
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3 Exploring options 
A policy package that offers guidance on the content of 
a future climate agreement (commitments for mitiga-
tion and adaptation activities as well as required finan-
cial transfers) and the process of achieving it should 
contain the following elements.
3.1 Differentiation of commitments and 
responsibilities
3.1.1 Commitments on mitigation
In the long-term, any definition of adequacy consist-
ent with Article 2 UNFCCC will require increased mit-
igation efforts from almost all countries. Therefore, 
an expansion of emission limitation commitments 
will form a central element of any future architecture 
of the climate regime. This expansion has two ele-
ments: deepening of quantitative commitments for 
those countries in Annex B and the adoption of com-
mitments for those countries outside of the limita-
tion regime (see section 2.1). The question is therefore 
which groups of countries have to take on what type of 
(mitigation) commitment? 
A crucial observation underlying our answer to this 
question is that mitigation efforts will be required in 
all countries that have mitigation opportunities, even 
in those with little moral obligation or practical abil-
ity to dedicate their own scarce resources to mitiga-
tion. The only way that mitigation potential in these 
countries can be taken advantage of is if other coun-
tries with responsibility and capability are obligated to 
provide the financial and technical resources to make 
substantive mitigation feasible.
Thus, for the purpose of determining which countries 
have to take on what types of commitments, we draw 
on a set of decision rules based on the three factors: 
potential, responsibility and capability (see Box 2). We 
then apply these decision rules to countries, to define 
an appropriate type of commitment. The term ‘com-
mitment’ refers to mitigation obligations (quantitative 
and qualitative) as well as to obligations to provide 
financial and technological resources.
Two basic principles underlie the decision rules:
• Potential to mitigate determines how much miti-
gation activity occurs in given country. (This 
mitigation activity refers to either absolute emis-
sions reductions, or avoidance of future emis-
sions through cleaner and more efficient develop-
ment.) 
• Responsibility and capability together determine 
the scale of financial and technological resources a 
country is required to devote to mitigation activ-
ity. (Accordingly, countries with high responsibil-
ity and/or capability will undertake mitigation 
activity domestically to the extent that they also 
have potential. Beyond that, they will provide sup-
port for mitigation activity in countries that have 
potential but comparatively little responsibility 
and/or capability.)
The first principle seeks to ensure that the climate 
regime is economically efficient, in the sense of direct-
ing mitigation effort toward those groups of countries 
in which there is the most potential for mitigation. 
The second principle seeks to ensure fairness, in that 
it requires that the mitigation activity is the task of 
those countries on the basis of their responsibility 
causing climate change and their capability to provide 
financial and technological resources to address that 
threat. 
The decision rules derived from these principles are 
shown in Box 2 below, and can be explained as fol-
lows: 
The ‘potential to mitigate’ (high or medium) deter-
mines the amount of reductions to be carried out 
domestically. (Low potential implies that domestic 
reductions are not a priority.) A country with a high 
potential would be obliged to exploit this potential, 
i.e. to accept quantitative commitments to reduce 
domestic emissions. However, this commitment is in 
the context of a climate regime where financial and 
technological resources for mitigation are assured, so 
the level of mitigation efforts as determined by this 
rule does not imply that countries would necessarily 
have to pay for their mitigation efforts themselves. 
The amount a country is obliged to pay toward miti-
gation is determined by ‘responsibility to mitigate’ in 
combination with ‘capability to mitigate’. Countries 
having high capability and responsibility would be 
obliged to pay for all their emission reductions, and 
also to provide financial and technological resources 
for mitigation in other countries with medium/low 
capability and responsibility. 
Higher levels of responsibility suggest not only a 
higher level of resources devoted to mitigation, but 
also a binding legal form of their mitigation commit-
ment. Commitments for those with medium responsi-
bility would be binding only if all ‘high responsibility’ 
countries have taken on mitigation and funding com-
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mitments, while low responsibility suggests mitigation 
action of a voluntary nature.
These decision rules can now be applied to the country 
groups identified in section 2.3. Since indicators for 
the given countries within a group span a consider-
able range of values (see Table 1), there should be a 
corresponding gradation of commitments. For clarity, 
we will talk here in terms of entire groups. 
Applying the decision rules result in (strict) reduction 
commitments for Annex I countries, but also imply 
quantifiable mitigation obligations for some non-
Annex I countries enabled by financial and techno-
logical transfers from the North (see Table 2; for more 
details on numbers see Table 1). It is worth emphasis-
ing that Annex I countries would still take the lead 
in combating climate change. However, at least some 
non-Annex I countries – those that are higher-emit-
ting and wealthier – would have to contribute sub-
stantially more to global mitigation efforts in the near 
future than they have in the past. 
A closer look at the resulting commitment reveals the 
following. Both Annex I groups retain Kyoto-style 
commitments that means quantified (absolute) emis-
sions reduction obligations with targets for Annex II 
countries being more demanding than Kyoto levels. 
The latter would also be committed to financial and 
technological transfers to non-Annex I countries, par-
ticularly to those with low to medium capability to 
mitigate.
But not only Annex I countries would have to take 
on quantitative mitigation commitments. Countries 
belonging to the group of NICs and RIDCs would 
have to do so as well – although subject to some con-
ditionality. We defined agreed triggers that lead to the 
start of developing country quantitative emission tar-
gets. Agreed triggers differ from ‘graduation’ triggers 
in that they include conditions for both developing 
and industrialised countries.
Applying the decision rules above results in absolute 
limitation or reduction targets for NICs due to their 
high responsibility and potential to mitigate. However, 
these commitments are subject to the conditionality 
that all major Annex I countries (including the US) 
take on quantified emission reduction commitments 
and fulfil their commitments to provide financial and 
technological resources. While NICs will have access 
to financial and technological resources (from Annex 
II countries) for part of their mitigation activities, 
this share is expected to be smaller than for RIDCs, in 
accordance with their relative capacities. Also the latter 
would be obliged to take on absolute limitation tar-
gets. However, the conditionality concerning Annex I 
participation in the regime is also valid for RIDCs, as 
well as the availability of full funding of incremental 
costs for mitigation activities by Annex II countries. 
Regardless of whether the terms of conditionality for 
quantified commitments are fulfilled, NICs as well as 
RIDCs would engage in qualitative mitigation com-
mitments (see Table 2). This type of commitments will 
also be obligatory for the group of ‘other developing 
Box 2: Decision rules for determining commitments
Potential to mitigate
 High potential ➞ High domestic reductions 
 Medium potential ➞ Limitation of domestic emssions
Responsibility to mitigate
 High responsibility ➞ Binding absolute reduction target
 Medium responsibility ➞ Quantitative commitments only binding if all ‘high responibility’  
   countries take on commitments and conditional on transfer of  
   adequate financial and technogical resources
 Low responsibility ➞ Qptional/voluntary mitigation commitments 
Capability to mitigate
 High capability ➞ Financial transfers for mitigation activities to ‘low/medium capability’  
   countries
 Medium capability ➞ Co-sharing: mitigation partly funded by ‘high capability’ countries
 Low capability ➞ All mitigation activities funded by ‘high capability’ countries 
33SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE ON EQUITY IN THE GREENHOUSE
 
countries’, but quantifiable mitigation commitments 
for these countries and the LDC group would not be 
justifiable – and not in line with the decision rules 
(until their status changes).
The approach chosen for differentiation among coun-
tries in order to assign different kinds of commitments 
is not static. As national circumstances in countries 
evolve over time the composition of the groups will 
change. As a country exceeds (or falls below) a certain 
threshold in all of the three criteria (potential, respon-
sibility, capability to mitigate), it will move from one 
group to another group and, as a consequence, will 
have to take on other types of commitments. Coun-
tries graduate when their indicators become more 
representative of the next higher group. Therefore, 
after each commitment period, the composition of 
the groups may need to be modified.
3.1.2 Commitments on adaptation
The issue of adaptation to climate change has risen 
rapidly up the policy agenda, both internationally and 
nationally. It is clear that much remains to be done to 
gain a better understanding of the multitude and com-
plexity of issues involved, through research and analy-
sis. It is also clear that far more ambitious efforts must 
be taken to chart a way forward in addressing these 
issues both inside and outside the international nego-
tiating process. One observation cannot be refuted: 
little further progress in the international negotiations 
can be expected without taking into account the con-
cerns of most of the developing countries, which relate 
in large part to funding and mechanisms for address-
ing adaptation to the impacts of climate change. 
Imperative for adaptation
It is increasingly evident that the consequences of cli-
mate change resulting from past GHG emissions will 
be unavoidable in the short-to-medium term. The 
Annex II ➞ binding (strict) absolute reduction targets, domestic reduction
 ➞ high direct payments to non-Annex I
Annex I, but not Annex II ➞ binding absolute reduction targets, domestic reduction
 ➞ low / no payments to non-Annex I
 ➞ absolute limitation or reduction targets, domestic reduction*
NICs ➞ qualitative commitments (see Table 2)
 ➞ some financial transfers from Annex II
 ➞ absolute limitation targets (conditional to funding)*
RIDCs ➞ qualitative commitments (see Table 2)
 ➞ high direct payments from Annex II
 ➞ no quantified commitments
Other DCs ➞ qualitative commitments (see Table 2)
 ➞ direct payments from Annex II
 ➞ no quantified commitments
LDCs ➞ qualitative commitments (see Table 2)
 ➞ direct payments from Annex II
* Targets only could become binding if all major Annex I countries have binding QUERO’s.
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spectre of a changing climate system puts millions of 
lives and livelihoods at risk, and is expected to result 
in an array of unrecoverable losses – to ecosystems, to 
biodiversity, to cultural heritage, to natural resources, 
to land mass and even to sovereignty, as is possible 
in the case of some small island states. An enor-
mous amount of associated human suffering can be 
expected. Adaptation to the predictable consequences 
of climate change, and the development of means to 
reduce vulnerability to its unpredictable impacts, will 
be necessary. The identification of appropriate means 
to support and facilitate adaptation is already an urgent 
priority, and strong adaptation actions must form a 
significant part of the post-Kyoto negotiations. The 
development of an agreement on burden sharing for 
the costs of adaptation is essential, together with the 
development of an equitable and just means to address 
adaptation needs in the most vulnerable nations. At 
the same time, seriously enhanced mitigation efforts 
are needed to slow the rate of GHG emissions, to avoid 
still further unrecoverable losses and suffering.
Equity
Many of the most severe adverse impacts of climate 
change will fall on the poorest countries and com-
munities. These countries and communities are likely 
to have the least adaptive capacity, the least bargaining 
power, and the least likelihood of having their inter-
ests adequately reflected in the international negotia-
tions on climate change. The ‘polluter pays’ principle 
enshrined in the UNFCCC makes it incumbent on 
Annex I countries to build the adaptive capacity of the 
poorer and most vulnerable countries. The notions 
of equity and justice must be recognised and applied 
in future negotiations, with the implications of these 
key principles reflected in both the decision-making 
process on adaptation, and in the substance of the 
decisions taken, with respect to impacts, vulnerabili-
ties and funding for adaptation measures.
Adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development
The most direct way to avoid the adverse impacts of 
climate change, and the consequent need to adapt to 
these impacts, is to reduce emissions of GHGs. Never-
theless, both mitigation and adaptation will be required 
if countries and communities are to succeed in coping 
both the causes and effects of the climate change chal-
lenge. Within developing countries, actions for mitiga-
tion and adaptation to climate change are both best 
addressed within an overall framework of ‘sustain-
able development’. While many adaptation measures 
within developing countries will benefit from integra-
tion (or ‘mainstreaming’) into development planning 
frameworks and strategies, this integration will entail 
additional cost, and under the UNFCCC it must be 
recognized that the costs of adaptation to the impacts 
of climate change are intended to be met through ‘new 
and additional’ funding, rather than merely through 
existing overseas development aid budgets.
Research and technology
There is much that needs to be learned about adap-
tation to climate change including ‘what to do’ and 
‘how to fund it’? The identification and role of appro-
priate technologies, including ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ tech-
nologies, are important in this respect. Enhancement 
of the research and analytical capacity of developing 
countries, with special emphasis on the most vulner-
able countries, is an absolute priority. Appropriate and 
capable institutions must be in place to assist vulner-
able countries in adapting to climate change, through 
targeted research and learning. Capacity is needed to 
support in-country analysis of adaptation needs, and 
the development of necessary adaptation strategies 
which countries can themselves undertake to address 
their future needs.
Capacity building
There is an enormous need for capacity building in 
developing countries if an equitable framework on 
adaptation is to be developed. Capacity building is 
needed at different levels and in many different areas: 
• Negotiating capacity: The strengthening of the col-
lective negotiating abilities of the members of the 
G77 and China group (and sub-groups within it), 
will make the international negotiations a more 
equitable process, and the results of these negotia-
tions more reflective of true developing country 
needs and priorities. This capacity-building has 
three elements: (i) building negotiating skills; (ii) 
building in-country ability to develop negotiating 
positions based on country priorities; (iii) creat-
ing opportunities for interaction between devel-
oping country negotiators between international 
negotiating sessions.
• Strengthening the most vulnerable communities: 
Most countries have done a preliminary vulnera-
bility to climate change assessment for their coun-
tries, to identify their most vulnerable sectors and 
regions. These assessments require refinement, to 
identify countries’ most vulnerable communities, 
so that strategies may be developed, based on the 
specific socio-economic needs of these commu-
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nities, to help them better cope with the future 
impacts of climate change.
• Sector-specific capacity building: Stakeholders 
involved in sectors that have been identified as 
vulnerable to climate change (e.g. water resource 
management, coastal zone management, agricul-
ture) require sector-specific capacity building on 
viable adaptation strategies and options.
• National policy level capacities: Many current poli-
cies may enhance vulnerability to climate change, 
rather than reduce vulnerability (e.g. policies that 
encourage or fail to deter the building houses on 
floodplains). Capacity building is needed to sen-
sitise policy-makers to the impacts their decision 
making may have on adaptive capacity. 
• Scientific and research capacity: In order to build 
adaptive capacity to deal with climate change, 
three main domains of scientific and technical 
knowledge and capacity must be enhanced in vul-
nerable countries: (i) the ability to construct cred-
ible scenarios of future changes, such as climate 
change, that would result in the exposure of peo-
ple and the environment to additional stresses; 
(ii) the ability to assess vulnerabilities that would 
arise from these exposures, and to assess adapta-
tion strategies to limit harm or enable recovery; 
and (iii) the ability to effectively communicate 
information about exposures, vulnerabilities and 
adaptation strategies to technically trained man-
agers, and the corresponding ability of managers 
to understand and use relevant information.
• Public awareness: Greater efforts are needed to 
increase public awareness of both the potential 
impacts of climate change and possible adaptation 
options and strategies, to enable decision making 
at the individual and community levels.
Funding adaptation
Funding for adaptation must be linked to responsibil-
ity for the impacts of climate change. The UNFCCC’s 
‘polluter pays’ principle needs to be operationalised for 
appropriate burden sharing, and existing liability and 
compensation schemes, e.g. the oil spill and nuclear 
regimes, may provide useful guidance. Adequate and 
predictable revenue streams are essential for adapta-
tion funding, and new and additional sources of fund-
ing must be identified. 
The current rules for funding adaptation through 
the GEF, which include incremental costs and global 
benefits criteria for project approval, must be modi-
fied to enable adaptation projects to be undertaken 
that result largely or exclusively in local benefits. For 
example, the relocation of communities away from 
coastal areas may be a necessary adaptation measure, 
but one that does not produce global benefits and that 
requires outside funding assistance. The allocation of 
separate and discrete funds by the GEF for adaptation 
to the impacts of climate change may facilitate the 
modification of the GEF’s funding strategy.
The capacity of countries to access GEF funding for 
adaptation, to conceive and undertake GEF projects, 
and to mainstream adaptation into national develop-
ment all need to be enhanced, and supported through 
new and additional funding. Activities for external 
funding need to be practised on a rational basis (e.g. 
through prioritising actions with adaptation as well 
as mitigation benefits, and prioritising the needs of 
the most vulnerable communities). Immediate focus 
should be given to finalising the negotiations on the 
SCCF, reemphasizing that adaptation to the impacts 
of climate change is of top priority.
Insurance
Innovative insurance schemes should be explored and 
piloted for the management of climate risks at the local, 
national, regional and international levels. A variety of 
alternative insurance schemes and risk transfer mech-
anisms hold great potential for attracting interest from 
the private capital markets, for instruments that can be 
used to address risks related to climate change impacts. 
Public-private partnerships, between the governments 
of nations vulnerable to the impacts of climate change 
and the insurance industry, present useful opportuni-
ties to leverage both governmental and private sec-
tor expertise to address climate-related risks. Mutual 
benefits for governments and the private sector alike 
can be realised, for example, in the related areas of 
hazard assessment and vulnerability reduction. The 
establishment of an international fund to backstop 
reinsurance schemes, to support private-public part-
nerships, or to backstop national disaster funds while 
they are in their infancy, may assist in rendering cer-
tain climate risks insurable. Such a fund might also 
provide necessary support to public-private insurance 
schemes that link insurance availability with incen-
tives to reduce vulnerability and enhance resilience. 
These sorts of schemes have already proven quite suc-
cessful in combining risk transfer with risk reduction 
strategies in disaster-prone communities (e.g. Turkish 
catastrophe insurance fund; see Linnerooth-Bayer et 
al. (2003)). The original AOSIS insurance proposal 
should additionally be revisited, as it offers a potential 
structure for a collective loss sharing arrangement for 
addressing the impacts of sea level rise.
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3.2 Political leadership 
While the content of a future climate agreement raises 
a number of challenges relating to mitigation, adapta-
tion and funding, the process of achieving such an 
agreement is deeply political and worth detailed analy-
sis. The roles of key players such as the US, the EU, 
G77 and China, and other parties need to be analysed 
with respect to their leadership potential.
3.2.1 The political situation: international stagnation, 
domestic progress
The international climate regime is at a crossroads 
again. More than six years have passed since the 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, but the treaty, the 
first attempt to seriously limit the emission of GHGs 
into the atmosphere, has still not entered into force. 
Although with 122 ratifications the protocol is on the 
way to become a universal treaty, the refusal by the 
USA and the reluctance by the Russian Federation to 
ratify have prevented its coming into effect. Whereas 
the absence of the US appears to be a longer-term 
constraint on the regime (see below), the delay of rati-
fication by Russia is the result of a multitude of factors 
that might change quickly – in either direction.
According to the revitalized ‘Kremlin astrology’ of 
the Cold War, this reluctance is in part motivated by 
internal political and economic factors and partly by 
pressure from the US. Nevertheless, there is a good 
chance that Russia will eventually ratify: According 
to a study conducted by the University of Kassel and 
Russian scientists from the Academy of Sciences, the 
Russian agrarian sector would not profit from climate 
change (Alcamo et al. 2003), the overall impact of 
ratifying the protocol on the Russia economy could 
be quite beneficial (Grubb 2004) and, according to 
financial analysts, Russia could earn up to $10 billion 
from the sale of emission allowances (Point Carbon 
2003). For the present effort, however, the question of 
Russian ratification is not the decisive factor. Whether 
or not the Kyoto Protocol will enter into force, the 
basic political conditions governing the strategy of 
the EU or other countries interested in a progressive 
climate regime remain remarkably similar (Oberthür/
Ott 2004). Some of these conditions will be explored 
in the next paragraphs.
The inclusion of the US in the climate regime has 
always been considered vital – first, because it emits 
one quarter of global emissions and, second, regime 
building without the last remaining superpower 
appeared to be rather futile. After the Bush presi-
dency, the administration of President Clinton gradu-
ally developed a more positive approach towards the 
climate regime. The appointment of Eileen Claussen 
in the State Department in 1996 preceded the accept-
ance of binding emission targets and Vice-President Al 
Gore flew to Kyoto instructing his negotiators ‘to show 
increased flexibility’. Nevertheless, a strong opposition 
in the Senate and its Foreign Relations Committee 
under Jesse Helms prevented any move towards ratifi-
cation of the protocol.
In March 2001 the newly elected president George 
Bush announced in a letter to senators his ‘opposition’ 
to the Kyoto Protocol. However, a concerted diplo-
matic effort of the EU and other countries around 
the world secured that the US would not prevent the 
adoption of the Bonn Agreement and the Marra-
kesh Accords in 2001. Internally, the national climate 
strategy of 14 February 2002 (US 2004) has a strong 
focus on bilateral support for mitigation in develop-
ing countries and relies on voluntary efforts by indus-
try. The strategy aims at reducing emissions by 18% 
until 2012 – relative to economic growth. This goal 
merely extends an existing trend towards lesser energy 
intensity, slows down the growth rate of US emissions 
but would ultimately nevertheless lead to an overall 
increase in emissions of about 30% by 2012 compared 
to 1990 (RIVM 2002).
This picture would not be complete, however, without 
taking note of the many sub-federal activities (Rabe 
2002; CCAP 2002; WWF 2003). Many cities and local 
communities have initiated climate-related measures, 
like Seattle, which plans to meet Kyoto targets locally 
and implement practical projects (Seattle City Lights). 
Furthermore, a number of states have voluntarily 
accepted climate targets (e.g. New York and New Jer-
sey) or cooperate in a climate action plan like the New 
England States. Even Texas, home of President Bush, 
developed a programme to foster wind energy and 
established a minimum-percentage of energy produc-
tion for renewable energies. Although these develop-
ments are not insignificant (the total GHG emissions 
of Texas are comparable to those of France) and may 
eventually shape policy at the national level, they are no 
substitute for an effective policy at the federal level.
The EU, by contrast, has taken a more proactive 
approach towards effective climate policy. Interna-
tionally, it collaborated with the G77 by forming the 
so-called Green Group in Berlin 1995, it pushed nego-
tiations towards conclusion in Kyoto 1997 and it pre-
vented a collapse of the climate regime after President 
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Bush in March 2001 announced his opposition to the 
Kyoto Protocol. The Union has fulfilled its obligations 
under the UNFCCC: its CO2 emissions in the year 2000 
were 0.5% below those of 1990, total GHG emissions 
were down by 3.5%. However, these emission trends are 
not stable and without new measures the EU may miss 
its target for the first commitment period (EU 2003).
Internally, the EU has adopted the European Climate 
Change Programme with its central cornerstone, the 
EU-wide emissions trading system. This was adopted 
on 2 July 2003 and as of 1 January 2005 companies 
from sectors covered by the scheme must limit their 
CO2 emissions to allocated levels in two periods, 
from 2005–2007 and 2008–2012. The emissions trad-
ing system is complemented by a multitude of other 
measures in the energy, transport and other sectors 
(EU 2001). While these measures may not be suffi-
cient to reach the ambitious goals of the Union, they 
nevertheless provide the first steps of a strategy to steer 
away from energy intensive and fossil based develop-
ment. In contrast to the prevalent fears in the US, this 
climate strategy appears not to have impeded eco-
nomic development.
Developing countries are not yet subject to emission 
regulations under the climate regime. Emissions have 
been rising and sometime between 2015 and 2020 
annual emissions are projected to equal those of indus-
trialised countries. However, taking cumulative emis-
sions into account, developing countries’ emissions 
would only exceed industrialised countries’ emissions 
by the middle of the century (den Elzen/Schaeffer 
2002); and per capita emissions in most developing 
countries are a tiny fraction of those in industrialised 
countries. 
Nevertheless, individual countries like China have in 
the past years considerably decreased their emissions 
of GHGs, partly in order to save scarce energy and 
partly in order to fight local air pollution. India has 
developed a domestic wind industry and used to pro-
vide leadership in the climate negotiations. This was 
essential in bringing about the Green Group of devel-
oping countries at COP 1 in Berlin, which entered into 
a strategic alliance with Europe to bring about the Ber-
lin Mandate. A similar process took place before and 
in Marrakesh to save the Kyoto Protocol from its most 
imminent danger after the failure of COP 6 in The 
Hague (Ott 2001). For the last years India appears to 
have entered into an informal alliance with China and 
Brazil for the purpose of leading the G77 and China 
bloc. This informal group is the only adversary of the 
very active group of Arabic oil exporting countries 
(OAPEC) that has enjoyed a disproportionately high 
degree of influence within the G77.
For geographical reasons and because of a lower 
capacity to adapt, developing countries are particu-
larly vulnerable to climate change. This is the reason 
why AOSIS, a group of low-lying islands and coastal 
states, has for a long time played a leadership role as the 
‘moral conscience’ of the regime and as the main agent 
for stronger measures. However, with the adoption of 
the Kyoto Protocol and the host of technicalities in 
the follow-up process, much of this impetus has gone. 
Since Marrakesh, the AOSIS group with a membership 
of more than 40 countries appears to have entered 
into an alliance with the group of LDCs (49 countries, 
partly overlapping with AOSIS), which are particularly 
vulnerable to climate change as well. Most efforts of 
this alliance at the moment are directed towards secur-
ing financial assistance under the various funds of the 
Convention or the Protocol. Both groups so far have 
not made a concerted attempt to chart the course for 
further development of the climate regime, despite 
their common interest in avoiding the consequences 
of climate change.
The identification of political interests is critical in 
forging alliances between different groups of develop-
ing countries. The governments of OPEC, for example, 
share a common interest in protecting their revenues 
from oil production, not dissimilar to other countries 
that depend on coal. In general, of course, developing 
countries share a common interest in ‘development’ 
in the sense of developing the economic capability to 
meet basic human needs of their people. RIDCs, almost 
by definition, have an interest in further industrialisa-
tion. However, the NICs have perhaps ‘arrived’ in this 
respect at least as much as non-Annex II Annex I Par-
ties, as reflected in the capability criteria in Table 1. 
Identifying sets of interest across political divides will 
be critical in forging a Green Group that can drive an 
equitable and adequate global climate agreement.
3.2.2 Leadership in the climate regime
The EU has so far largely fulfilled the role the US has 
left void – namely that of the engine of the regime. 
However, leadership roles can change as the ozone 
negotiations have shown: whereas until 1989 the US 
was pushing for stronger measures in the framework 
of the Montreal Protocol, it fell back to a laggard posi-
tion afterwards and the baton was taken up by Europe. 
It is not inconceivable that the US at some point may 
assume a leadership role in the climate regime. This is 
not to be expected soon, however.
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Experience in international environmental governance 
indicates that in order to achieve progress in regula-
tion, leadership by a strong country or group of coun-
tries is required. This is not the call for a hegemon as a 
prerequisite for regime building, as pronounced by the 
theory of hegemonic stability (Gilpin 1981; Kindle-
berger 1988), but an acknowledgement of the fact that 
uphill negotiations need a strong pusher. Leadership 
can take different forms that have been referred to in 
various terms by various authors. In particular, the fol-
lowing distinctions can be made (Gupta/Grubb 1999, 
Oberthür/Ott 1999). First, a leader may make use of 
general political and economic weight, referred to as 
structural leadership. Second, leadership in interna-
tional negotiations often requires the skilful build-
ing of coalitions and alliances, sometimes referred 
to as instrumental leadership. Third, and perhaps 
most importantly, leadership is advanced effectively 
by demonstrating solutions to others, i.e. directional 
leadership. Domestic action, in the form of leader-
ship by example, is a decisive element of this third fac-
tor. The EU has at different stages of the negotiations 
employed one or more of these leadership qualities, 
but it lacks a coherent strategy that is persistent over a 
longer period of time. Equally often the Union appears 
weak, fragmented and structurally incapable of exer-
cising effective leadership.
This, however, is urgently required for a progressive 
development of the climate regime. There are exam-
ples for regime building without a hegemon, but 
there is as of yet no example in international environ-
mental policy for successful regime building against 
a hegemon. The term hegemony, derived from the 
old Greek hegesthai (to lead), is most often used to 
describe a power structure characterised by a great dif-
ference in the military, political and economic strength 
of one country versus other countries and that cannot 
be altered unilaterally by another state or group of 
states. The US may be described as such a hegemon, 
not only globally, but also regarding climate change 
because of its share of emissions and because of its 
political and economic potential to contribute to a 
successful solution.
In 2002, however, the US changed its position from 
a laisser-faire approach to one of opposition to the 
Kyoto Protocol. This is evidenced by the forked strat-
egy towards developing countries: whereas at home 
the unwillingness of the South to take on commit-
ments is portrayed as unfair to its industry and thus 
an obstacle for ratification, in New Delhi the US chief 
negotiator Harlan Watson stated that ‘we must recog-
nize that it would be unfair – indeed counterproduc-
tive - to condemn developing nations to slow growth 
or no growth by insisting that they take on impracti-
cal and unrealistic greenhouse gas targets’ (Watson 
2002). Furthermore, the US has employed bilateral 
diplomacy and entered into fourteen bilateral trea-
ties with Annex I countries (Australia, Canada, Italy, 
Japan, Russia) and developing countries (e.g. China, 
India, Mexico). There is nothing wrong with bilateral 
diplomacy, but in the absence of multilateral efforts 
this runs the risk of undermining the protocol.
The obstruction of the Kyoto Protocol might not be 
an officially announced strategy, but it is nevertheless 
factual policy. The climate community therefore faces 
the task of stabilising and evolving the regime against 
opposition of the world’s major player. There are at 
least two well-known examples where large parts of the 
global community successfully established a regime 
against the will of the US: both the negotiations on 
a landmine treaty and on the International Criminal 
Court have shown that a dedicated NGO community 
together with key countries are able to overcome US 
opposition. The Landmines Treaty of 1997 has been 
ratified by 140 countries and despite the non-ratifi-
cation by the US, Russia and China the production, 
stockpiling and use of landmines has been reduced 
drastically (Human Rights Watch 2003). In fact, the 
trade in anti-personnel landmines has gone down to 
zero. Second, the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
is established and has been ratified by almost 100 
countries. The establishment of the ICC is perhaps 
even more significant, since the current US adminis-
tration is employing bilateral diplomacy in attempts 
to undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
court (Becker 2003).
Differences between these issues and climate change 
should not be overlooked, however. Neither the Land-
mines Treaty nor the establishment of the ICC involved 
economic and social decisions and ramifications on a 
comparable scale: averting climate change does imply 
a complete restructuring of the way our economies 
produce and consume. Second, support for the Land-
mines Treaty and the ICC from European and other 
countries was less ambivalent than in the case of the 
climate regime - maybe partly because of these eco-
nomic implications. However, apart from a genuine 
concern over the disruption of the climate system, the 
desire to unify and strengthen external policy of the 
EU has in the past provided sufficient momentum to 
push the process forward (Hovi et al. 2003).
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3.2.3 Leadership strategies
The USA will not ratify the Kyoto Protocol in the fore-
seeable future. Even a change in the presidency would 
not affect the composition of the Senate, which must 
accept international treaties with a two-thirds major-
ity. Voters in the US tend to balance a Democratic 
President with a Republican Senate. Proposals for a 
realistic strategy must take this fact into account. The 
world has embarked on the ambitious goal of prevent-
ing dangerous interference with the climate system 
– and it has decided on a global structure and institu-
tions of how to deal with it. Political or diplomatic 
pressure from outside might have only minor impact 
on US policy – internal political processes alone will 
lead to change. These internal political processes can 
and should be supported from outside, however.
As a first pillar of a successful strategy, therefore, alter-
native avenues of co-operation with and engaging the 
US outside of the Kyoto regime should be explored. 
Support (and possibly funding) of sub-federal entities 
like states, local communities, scientific and advocacy 
groups in the US has the potential to change the politi-
cal climate and thus increase pressure at the domestic 
level. Implementing climate policies at the sub-federal 
level will furthermore increase the chances of re-inte-
grating the US in the climate regime, since otherwise 
the implementation gap would increase even further. 
However, the taking on of substantive quantitative 
commitments by developing countries would prob-
ably be dependent on a full-scale re-entry of the US 
into the climate regime.
Sometimes it is also suggested that the EU and other 
trading partners employ trade-related measures com-
patible with the WTO in order to offset potential com-
parative disadvantages arising from climate policies 
(Biermann/Brohm 2003). However, there are many 
ways of co-operation with federal and sub-federal 
actors, comprising the following, inter alia:
At the federal level:
• Scientific co-operation with a strong emphasis on 
the IPCC.
• Technological co-operation like the Hydrogen ini-
tiative of 16/17 June 2003 or the Carbon Seques-
tration Leadership Forum signed on 25 June 2003 
between the EU, the US and other industrialised 
countries.
• Political co-operation on certain policies like the 
establishment of standards for production and 
consumption or renewable energies (e.g. in the 
context of ‘renewables 2004’, the conference on 
renewable energy, June 2004 in Bonn).
At the state and community level:
• Increased flow of information with state and local 
governments, legislators, NGOs and the respective 
industry on policies and technologies.
• Agreements with entities on the state and com-
munity level.
At the private level:
• Support for US-based and international NGOs 
working on US policy at the community, state and 
federal level.
• Support for and co-operation with US-based 
scientific institutions (PEW, CCAP, UCS, WRI, 
Worldwatch, etc; but also institutions dealing with 
the science of climate change might need sup-
port);
• Fostering and facilitation of business-to-busi-
ness conferences between the US and European/
Japanese companies and initiatives furthering the 
exchange of information.
A second pillar of a climate strategy in the years to 
come consists of a firm commitment by all Kyoto Par-
ties towards the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakesh 
Accords. This means first of all to prepare implemen-
tation of its commitments as if it was in force already. 
Furthermore, the protocol should form the basis of 
any negotiations for the time after 2012 and preserv-
ing the integrity of the Kyoto Protocol should be the 
guiding principle even in the case that Russia refuses 
to ratify. Any attempt to start from a clean slate with 
a ‘Plan B’ would be equivalent to opening Pandora’s 
box and unleash destructive forces that could severely 
damage all efforts aimed at climate protection for a 
considerable time. 
There are at least two ways to enact the Kyoto Proto-
col without Russia, thereby avoiding the dangers of 
negotiating a new treaty: For example, Article 25 of the 
Kyoto Protocol could be modified, which governs the 
entry into force of this treaty and requires that indus-
trialised countries must represent 55 percent of the 
1990 industrialised country emissions. Alternatively, 
the Kyoto Protocol could be applied provisionally, as 
has been done in the case of the GATT for several 
decades, which was based on a provisional application 
of the Statute of the International Trade Organization 
that never entered into force. The Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol should therefore meet in order to discuss the 
situation and develop a strategy to deal with the uncer-
tainty caused by the Russian failure to ratify.
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Third, the EU will have to play an equally strong role as 
in the past if it wants progress on climate change – and 
probably more. This concerns on the one hand the 
capacity to compete diplomatically with the United 
States, but it concerns especially the relationship with 
the South. Since COP 8 in New Delhi, diplomatic rela-
tions between the EU and developing countries are 
strained and need a conscious rebuilding (Ott 2002). 
As experiences with overcoming obstacles in the past 
have demonstrated, progress in the climate regime was 
usually dependent on a good understanding between 
the EU and developing countries. This requires first of 
all an open ear for the needs and fears of the South and, 
second, the willingness to provide substantial financial 
means for mitigation and adaptation activities. In fact, 
the EU (plus Canada and Japan) must at least make up 
for the (financial) gap that was left by the refusal of the 
US to engage in the Kyoto Protocol. This compensa-
tion is particularly important concerning travel costs 
for LDC delegates for COP/MOPs and other impor-
tant meetings. The EU should furthermore explore 
possibilities for co-operation with developing coun-
tries on a plurilateral basis. The establishment of an 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), for 
example, possibly as an outcome of the international 
renewable energy conference June 2004 in Bonn would 
not require universal participation and might be of 
great importance for technological progress and as a 
political sign for developing countries.
It is not yet discernible what kind of impact the 
enlargement of the EU in May 2004 to a community 
of 25 countries will have on its ability to play a strong 
role internationally. Of course, its economic and 
political weight will increase along with the increase 
in population and markets. However, the new member 
states will add additional interests and thus complex-
ity. Merging the economies and societies of Eastern 
Europe into the EU will demand a great deal of atten-
tion and this might lead to an even more inward-look-
ing attitude of the Union than usual. Furthermore, 
financially the enlargement might negatively affect the 
ability to co-operate with developing countries due 
to the large financial flows from West to East that will 
decrease the North-South transfers. And finally, the 
new accession countries will not be part of the EU 
burden sharing agreement (‘bubble’) but covered by 
the internal Emissions Trading System. This will lead 
to conflicts of interest when the system is linked with 
CDM activities: whereas the Western members have an 
incentive to include CDM activities, the new member 
states fare best when the role of the CDM is kept low, 
since this will limit the supply of allowances and thus 
raise their revenues.
At the process level, the increased number of coun-
tries after May 2004 will threaten to further stifle the 
negotiation capacity of the EU. Certainly, improved 
negotiation tactics and strategies since 1997 have 
considerably enhanced the Union’s diplomatic per-
formance, partly supported by technological develop-
ments like mobile phones (Oberthür / Ott 1999: 83). 
There is a chance that the adoption of a European 
Constitution – which failed to get adopted last year 
but may be approved in 2004 – will compensate for 
the increased complexity (Schaik / Egenhofer 2003). In 
any case it can be expected that the enlargement will 
have a profound impact on the EU in the years 2005 
et seq. – exactly those years where the second com-
mitment period (or an enactment without Russian 
ratification) is supposed to be negotiated. These con-
ditions will require careful and determined leadership 
by the respective country holding the presidency in the 
Union. The United Kingdom will have an especially 
important role in the medium term, since it will not 
only hold the EU presidency in the latter half of 2005, 
but also chair the G8 at the same time.
Fourth, developing countries can only regain their 
leadership qualities if they rethink their role in the 
climate negotiations, thus rendering their negotiating 
position more effective (Athanasiou / Baer 2002). This 
concerns individual countries as well as the group as 
such. As regards the group, the fixation on the G77 
and China bloc – historically with good reasons – has 
led to stagnation, since the diverging and sometimes 
conflicting interests of such a diverse group of coun-
tries tends to lead to agreement on the lowest common 
denominator. It is thus of paramount importance to 
realise these differences and make serious attempts 
at reconciling and co-ordinating a best possible out-
come. This would also pave the way for a creative, 
practical and forward-looking mode of differentiation 
– a key element of any climate regime post-2012 (see 
section 2.3).
The sober analysis of strengths and weaknesses of vari-
ous developing countries as well as acknowledgement 
of the differences within developing countries would 
furthermore improve the chances for coalition build-
ing with the European Union. However, more impor-
tant appears to be the careful coalition building within 
the G77 and China in order to foster leadership. An 
adequate response of that bloc towards the threat of 
climate change has so far been prevented by the work 
of OPEC, in particular the group of Arabic countries 
within OPEC. Part of the political strategy will require 
treating OPEC countries similarly to laggard Annex I 
countries – challenging them to participate construc-
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tively, isolating them where they remain obstructive 
and not allowing this group to block action by the 
G77 and China.
This can only be countered by a large coalition of 
countries, including China, India and Brazil, and sup-
ported by a second layer of rapidly industrialising 
countries like South Africa and Thailand. Incidentally, 
this is also the group of countries that might most 
reasonably be expected to take on some form of cli-
mate commitment. Such a coalition has something of 
a precedent in the G 20 Group of countries13 that were 
instrumental in voicing developing country interests 
in the WTO negotiations at Cancun. This coalition 
to support an effective and equitable global climate 
agreement would be supported by AOSIS, which has 
a vital interest in a successful climate regime. LDCs 
would probably participate in such a coalition if there 
is sufficient action on adaptation/sustainable develop-
ment. NGOs are likely to support such an alliance.
Fifth, there is a range of options for civil society actors 
to adapt to new challenges posed by the complexity 
of the climate challenge, accelerating globalisation 
processes and the unilateral attitude of the USA. This 
does not only refer to NGOs, civil society’s well-known 
agents, but also to other actors, individuals and loose 
networks of citizens. Despite the gravity of the threat 
posed to life, health and property of people around 
the world, a ‘climate movement’ is still lacking. These 
threats to life, health and property caused by climate 
change are as real as those posed by economic globali-
sation processes. But in stark contrast to the develop-
ments in the anti-globalisation movement, this mes-
sage appears not to have come across. Possibly, new 
and creative ways of protesting and networking will 
have to be developed to foster a global climate move-
ment.
As regards NGOs, the Climate Action Network (CAN) 
is already well equipped and has proven one of the most 
effective tools for global policymaking (Waddell 2003). 
The establishment of a CAN international secretariat 
in Bonn is one further step to improve its effectiveness. 
Further improvements are possible, however, and ways 
to learn from the campaign to ban landmines and the 
coalition for an International Criminal Court should 
be studied. The lesson of widest possible participa-
tion is particularly important, especially in the years 
to come. While the larger organisations like Green-
peace and WWF have a policy to fund their Southern 
members, smaller organisations find it increasingly 
difficult to participate effectively in the negotiations. 
Furthermore, the integration of development organi-
sations (like Oxfam or ActionAid) would considerably 
improve credibility and effectiveness of NGO-lobby-
ing. NGOs might furthermore explore whether they 
could play a strong role in the processes or institutions 
that might result from the conference ‘renewables 
2004’ in June 2004 and maybe even become part of 
such an institutional structure. The CURES coalition 
(Citizens United for Renewable Energy and Sustain-
ability) that was established in October 2003 could be 
a first and forward-looking step in this direction.
The NGO community might also attempt to gain 
increased influence on domestic policy in the US. If it 
is true that policy change in the US will have to come 
from within, the achievement of a more favourable 
political climate in this one country is a top prior-
ity for domestic and international organisations alike. 
The US may be a hegemonic power, but it is not mon-
olithic. National environmental organisations could 
be supported, even financially (the crash of the new 
economy and the decline of the stock markets has 
dried up many financial resources). Campaigns might 
be co-ordinated not only among domestic groups and 
organisations, but also with international ones and 
those of other countries. Needless to say that Southern 
NGOs and Southern civil society are crucial for the 
future of the climate regime – any support for those 
groups and individuals enhances the chances to win 
allies among developing countries.
Finally, NGOs might play an even more active role in 
facilitating a rapprochement between the EU and the 
South. They might furthermore have an important 
role in the process of differentiation between develop-
ing countries. If NGOs cannot agree on credible, effec-
tive and pragmatic solutions for differentiating within 
the G77 and China, prospects for agreement among 
politicians and negotiators are rather low.
13 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela.
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An
ne
x 
II
N
AI
I A
nn
ex
 I
N
IC
RI
DC
Ot
he
r D
C
LD
C
1
Au
st
ra
lia
Be
la
ru
s
Ba
hr
ai
n
Al
ge
ria
Ar
m
en
ia
Af
gh
an
ist
an
1
2
Au
st
ria
Bu
lg
ar
ia
Br
un
ei
*
An
tig
ua
 &
 B
ar
bu
da
Az
er
ba
ija
n
An
go
la
2
3
Be
lg
iu
m
Cr
oa
tia
Cu
ba
Ar
ge
nt
in
a
Bo
liv
ia
Ba
ng
la
de
sh
3
4
Ca
na
da
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
Isr
ae
l
Ba
ha
m
as
Ca
m
er
oo
n
Be
ni
n
4
5
De
nm
ar
k
Es
to
ni
a
Ka
za
kh
st
an
Ba
rb
ad
os
Co
ng
o
Bh
ut
an
5
6
Fin
la
nd
Hu
ng
ar
y
Ko
re
a 
(S
ou
th
)
Be
liz
e
Co
ok
 Is
la
nd
s
Bu
rk
in
a 
Fa
so
6
7
Fr
an
ce
La
tv
ia
Ku
w
ai
t
Bo
sn
ia
 &
 H
er
ze
go
vin
a
Cô
te
 d
‘Iv
oi
re
Bu
ru
nd
i
7
8
Ge
rm
an
y
Lit
hu
an
ia
Qa
ta
r
Bo
ts
w
an
a
Do
m
in
ica
Ca
m
bo
di
a
8
9
Gr
ee
ce
Po
la
nd
Sa
ud
i A
ra
bi
a
Br
az
il
Ec
ua
do
r
Ca
pe
 V
er
de
9
10
Ice
la
nd
Ro
m
an
ia
Si
ng
ap
or
e
Ch
ile
Eg
yp
t
Ce
nt
ra
l A
fri
ca
n 
Re
pu
bl
ic
10
11
Ire
la
nd
Ru
ss
ia
n 
Fe
de
ra
tio
n
Su
rin
am
e
Ch
in
a
Ga
bo
n
Ch
ad
11
12
Ita
ly
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Tr
in
id
ad
 &
 To
ba
go
Co
lo
m
bi
a
Ge
or
gi
a
Co
m
or
os
12
13
Ja
pa
n
Sl
ov
en
ia
Tu
rk
m
en
ist
an
Co
st
a 
Ri
ca
Gh
an
a
Co
ng
o,
 D
em
. R
ep
ub
lic
 
13
14
Lie
ch
te
ns
te
in
Tu
rk
ey
Un
ite
d 
Ar
ab
 E
m
ira
te
s
Cy
pr
us
Gu
at
em
al
a
Dj
ib
ou
ti
14
15
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Uk
ra
in
e
Uz
be
kis
ta
n
Do
m
in
ica
n 
Re
pu
bl
ic
Ho
nd
ur
as
Eq
ua
to
ria
l G
ui
ne
a
15
16
M
on
ac
o
El
 S
al
va
do
r
In
di
a
Er
itr
ea
16
17
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Fij
i
In
do
ne
sia
Et
hi
op
ia
17
18
Ne
w
 Z
ea
la
nd
Gr
en
ad
a
Ja
m
ai
ca
Ga
m
bi
a
18
19
No
rw
ay
Gu
ya
na
Ke
ny
a
Gu
in
ea
19
20
Po
rtu
ga
l
Ira
n
Ky
rg
yz
st
an
Gu
in
ea
-B
iss
au
20
21
Sp
ai
n
Jo
rd
an
Lib
ya
Ha
iti
21
22
Sw
ed
en
Le
ba
no
n
M
ac
ed
on
ia
, F
YR
Ki
rib
at
i
22
23
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
M
al
ay
sia
M
ol
do
va
La
os
23
24
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
M
al
ta
M
on
go
lia
Le
so
th
o
24
25
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
 o
f A
m
er
ica
M
au
rit
iu
s
M
or
oc
co
Lib
er
ia
25
47SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE ON EQUITY IN THE GREENHOUSE
 
An
ne
x 
II
N
AI
I A
nn
ex
 I
 N
IC
RI
DC
Ot
he
r D
C
LD
C
26
M
ex
ico
Na
m
ib
ia
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
26
27
Om
an
Ni
ca
ra
gu
a
M
al
aw
i
27
28
Pa
na
m
a 
Ni
ge
ria
M
al
di
ve
s
28
29
Pe
ru
Pa
kis
ta
n 
M
al
i
29
30
Ph
ili
pp
in
es
Pa
pu
a 
Ne
w
 G
ui
ne
a
M
au
rit
an
ia
30
31
Sa
in
t K
itt
s &
 N
ev
is
Pa
ra
gu
ay
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e
31
32
Sa
in
t L
uc
ia
Se
yc
he
lle
s
M
ya
nm
ar
32
33
Sa
in
t V
in
ce
nt
 &
 G
re
na
di
ne
s
Sr
i L
an
ka
Ne
pa
l
33
34
So
ut
h 
Af
ric
a
Sw
az
ila
nd
Ni
ge
r
34
35
Th
ai
la
nd
Sy
ria
Rw
an
da
 
35
36
Tu
ni
sia
Ta
jik
ist
an
Sa
m
oa
36
37
Ur
ug
ua
y
Ve
ne
zu
el
a
Sa
o 
To
m
e 
& 
Pr
in
cip
e
37
38
Vi
et
na
m
Se
ne
ga
l
38
39
Zi
m
ba
bw
e
Si
er
ra
 Le
on
e
39
40
So
lo
m
on
 Is
la
nd
s
40
41
So
m
al
ia
41
42
Su
da
n
42
43
Ta
nz
an
ia
43
44
To
go
44
45
Tu
va
lu
45
46
Ug
an
da
46
47
Va
nu
at
u
47
48
Ye
m
en
48
49
Za
m
bi
a
49
Du
e 
to
 a
 la
ck
 o
f d
at
a 
Co
ok
 Is
la
nd
s, 
Ira
q*
, K
or
ea
 (N
or
th
), 
M
ar
sh
al
l I
sla
nd
s, 
M
icr
on
es
ia
, N
au
ru
, N
iu
e,
 P
al
au
, S
er
bi
a 
& 
M
on
te
ne
gr
o,
 S
an
 M
ar
in
o 
an
d 
To
ng
a,
 a
re
 n
ot
 in
clu
de
d 
in
 a
ny
 li
st
.  
* 
 N
on
-P
ar
ty
 to
 th
e 
UN
FC
CC
. 
Da
ta
 so
ur
ce
: W
RI
 (2
00
3)
. G
ro
up
in
gs
 a
re
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
au
th
or
s’ 
an
al
ys
is.
48 SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE ON EQUITY IN THE GREENHOUSE
 
The Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment 
and Energy (Germany) and the Energy Research Cen-
tre (ERC, South Africa) have initiated a ‘South-North 
Dialogue’ between 14 institutions from developing as 
well as industrialised countries (see list of participants 
below). The present report reflects the results of this 
dialogue project. 
Objective of the ‘South-North Dialogue’
The purpose of the ʻSouth-North Dialogue  ʼ was 
to discuss building blocks of a future international 
framework to combat climate change in a 
participatory manner. The discussion comprised 
issues related to mitigation as well as adaptation 
and was based on the underlying principles of 
equity, adequacy, and development. Key objective 
of the ʻSouth-North Dialogue  ʼwas the elaboration 
of concrete policy recommendations that are 
compatible with the specific needs of politicians 
in the next few years but are also embedded in a 
long-term framework built upon the three pillars 
mentioned above. 
Project participants
The composition of the project group aimed at a 
balance between the perspectives and concerns of the 
developing and industrialised world. Furthermore, it 
also represents the regions and countries that are par-
ticularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change 
and/or hold the strongest potential to combat climate 
change and its effects. An additional criterion for 
choosing the institutions involved was their research 
record regarding the further development of the 
climate change regime.
Process of the dialogue
The kick-off workshop of the project was held in 
June 2003 in Wuppertal. It was carried out in an open 
manner thereby allowing that suggestions by partici-
pants on procedure, as well as on the substance of the 
project, could be taken into account. After an in-depth 
discussion about the potential scope and topics of the 
‘South-North Dialogue’ the participants agreed on 
its structure and content and identified seven build-
ing blocks of a possible future climate regime. These 
building blocks were further discussed among spe-
cialised sub-groups during the following months in 
an e-mail dialogue. 
Preliminary results of the project were presented dur-
ing a side-event at COP 9 in Milan. Subsequently, a 
second workshop was held in Cape Town, South Africa 
in January 2004 during which concrete policy recom-
mendations, based on the findings and outcomes of 
the earlier discussions, were discussed. The results of 
this workshop are reflected in this report.
A second phase of the project shall expand the dialogue 
to the political level, in order to foster mutual under-
standing and trust between negotiators and policy 
makers and thereby to facilitate future negotiations on 
a second commitment period. It is planned to organ-
ize workshops with high-ranking climate negotiators, 
which shall be as informal as possible, avoiding the 
restrictive atmosphere of official negotiations in order 
to enable a constructive exchange of positions. Apart 
from the discussion of the results of the first phase the 
main goal of these workshops will be the unbiased 
communication between the delegates themselfs. 
Further information on the project ‘South-North Dia-
logue – Equity in the Greenhouse’ is available at www.
wupperinst.org/Sites/Projects/rg2/1085.html or con-
tact Bernd Brouns (bernd.brouns@wupperinst.org) 
and Hermann Ott (hermann.ott@wupperinst.org).
Annex 2:  
'South-North Dialogue – Equity in the 
Greenhouse': project outline
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Person Organisation Country/region
Steve Bernow (✝)1 Tellus Institute USA
Preety M Bhandari The Energy and Resources Institute India
Bernd Brouns Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy Germany
Ogunlade Davidson Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town South Africa
Saleemul Huq International Institute for Environment and Development United Kingdom
Pan Jiahua The Chinese Academy for Social Science China
Sivan Kartha Tellus Institute USA
Andrzej Kassenberg Institute for Sustainable Development Poland
Yasuko Kameyama National Institute for Environmental Studies Japan
Izumi Kubota National Institute for Environmental Studies Japan
Emilio Lèbre La Rovere Federal University of Rio de Janeiro Brazil
Jürgen Lefevere2 Foundation for International Environmental Law & Development AOSIS
M J Mace Foundation for International Environmental Law & Development AOSIS
Hermann E Ott Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy Germany
Atiq Rahman Centre for Advanced Studies Bangladesh
Agus P Sari Pelangi Indonesia
Youba Sokona Environnement et Développement du Tiers-Monde Senegal
Fernando Tudela3 El Colegio de Mexico Mexico
Harald Winkler Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town South Africa
1. Steve Bernow died on 5 July 2003. This report is dedicated to him.
2. Jürgen Lefevere left FIELD (and the project team) in August 2003 for the EU Commission (DG Environment). 
3.  Fernando Tudela became Under Secretary of Planning and Environmental Policies at the Ministry of the Environment and  
Natural Resources in October 2003.
